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ABSTRACT
THE EFFECTS OF COMPETITION AND EXTERNAL 
REWARDS ON INTRINSIC MOTIVATION
by
GARY S. GOLDSTEIN 
University of New Hampshire, December, 1980
A number of studies have demonstrated that the presence 
of an external reward reduces intrinsic motivation. Deci's
(1975) theory of cognitive evaluation and Lepper, Greene and 
Nisbett's (1973) overjustification hypothesis account for 
these findings using attribution theory. Basically, these 
two theories imply that when the reasons for performing a be­
havior can be attributed to the activity itself, the behavior 
will most likely be self-sustained without any external 
inducement. However, to the extent that a person attributes 
the cause of his or her behavior to some external constraint, 
it is likely that the behavior will be performed only in the 
presence of that constraint.
Most studies have focused primarily on the detrimental 
effect of concrete rewards on intrinsically interesting acti­
vities (e.g., money, prizes, food). Recent studies have 
extended the problem to include other types of external con­
straints which are less tangible than the above rewards. The 
present study focused on one such external variable that might 
reduce intrinsic motivation: competition.
To test this hypothesis, a two by two factorial design 
was employed with two levels of Reward (Reward and No Reward) 
and two levels of Competition (Competition and No Competition). 
Thirty-two pairs of undergraduate males were randomly as­
signed to the four cells of the design, with eight pairs per 
cell. A methodology similar to ones used in the literature 
was employed for the present study. The target activity was 
Soma, a puzzle task which required the subjects to reproduce 
two dimensional pictures with three dimensional blocks.
Rewarded subjects were paid 50 cents for each correct item 
for a maximum of two dollars. No mention of reward was made 
to subjects in the No Reward conditions. Subjects in the 
Competition conditions were read instructions which indicated 
that they were working on the same task as the other subject 
and that the experimenter was going to compare their perfor­
mance. Subjects in the No Competition conditions were told 
that they were working on different tasks. The amount of time 
the subject played with the Soma task during a free choice 
period served as the measure of intrinsic motivation. In 
addition, responses to two inventories measuring interest in 
the task also served as a measure of intrinsic motivation.
It was predicted that subjects in the Competition condition 
and the Reward condition would show less intrinsic motivation 
than would those in the No Competition condition and No 
Reward condition respectively.
In general, such predictions were not confirmed. There 
was no significant main effects for Reward in the expected
x
direction for any of the inventory items or free choice time.
In addition, only one inventory item for the Competition var­
iable reached statistical significance. The most consistent 
pattern found in the data was a Reward by Competition inter­
action which indicated that subjects in the Reward-No 
Competition condition showed the least amount of intrinsic 
motivation when compared with subjects in the other cdnditions.
An examination of the free choice time indicated a 
bimodal distribution of scores. For each cell, subjects had 
a tendency to play with the task for a relatively long period 
of time or for no time at all. These differences were treated 
as an additional independent variable related to free choice 
time. An ANOVA performed on this converted design indicated 
that subjects who did not play with the task at all during the 
free choice period rated themselves as more competitive than 
did those who played with the task during this period, thus 
providing some support for the hypothesis. In addition, 
subjects who did not play with the task at all during the free 
choice period also found the task more difficult during the 
earlier phases of the experiment. Thus, feelings of competency 
may have also mediated the final results.
A number of reasons for the lack of positive results for 
the Reward variable were explored. These included (a) the 
possibility that subjects did not believe they were going to 
keep the reward, Cbl a lack of initial interest in the task and 
Cel a lask of sufficient external validity in the current de­






Psychologists have used the concept of motivation to 
answer the question of how behavior is energized and di­
rected. Traditionally, the answer to this question comes 
under the heading of extrinsic motivation. The cause of 
behavior is reduced to some bodily tissue need such as food, 
water, sex and the avoidance of tissue pain or to some ac­
quired drive based on processes of secondary reinforcement 
(Hunt, 1965). In these cases of extrinsic motivation, the 
person is performing the behavior for some goal independent 
of the activity itself. But both psychologists and lay 
people have noted that various organisms maintain extensive 
activity levels even when the above parameters are not 
present. There appears to be a second class of motivation 
to perform an activity: intrinsic motivation.
Although no precise theoretical conception of intrin­
sic motivation has yet to be developed, a common element of 
most definitions involves a person performing an activity 
for no apparent reason except the activity itself. Actions 
are valued for their own sake and may be self-sustained 
without any external inducement. Although precise mech­
anisms thought to underlie intrinsic motivation differ
1
2depending upon one' a theoretical perspective, the above is 
the commonly accepted definition of intrinsic motivation and 
also serves quite adequately as an operational definition 
(Deci, 1975a).
The concept of intrinsic motivation enjoyed little 
theoretical and empirical attention during the early days 
of experimental psychology. Couched in the language of 
early instinct theory, Woodworth (1918) noted that an acti­
vity can provide its own drive derived from innate general 
capacities or "native equipment." He stated that "The end 
furnishes the motive force for the search for means but once 
the means are found, they are apt to become interesting on 
their own account" (p. 104) . This idea is reiterated in 
Allport's (1937) notion of functional autonomy. In the 
late 1940's and early 1950's much of the work was limited 
to studies of curiosity, exploration, and manipulation in 
animals (e.g., Berlyne, 1950; Butler, 1953; Butler & Harlow, 
1957; Harlow, 1950; Montgomery, 1952). The most common 
approach used to explain these phenomena was that of drive 
naming (.e.g., exploratory drive, manipulatory drive, a drive 
to avoid'boredom). White (1959) criticizes this drive 
naming approach noting that these behaviors do not fit the 
definitional constraints of traditional drive theory. Unlike 
drives, these intrinsically motivated behaviors are not asso­
ciated with any non-nervous system deficit or a consumatory 
response which reduces a need. Instead, these activities 
appear to be related to internally rewarding consequences
3which are located in the central nervous system and have no 
appreciable biological effects on non-nervous system tissue. 
Thus, intrinsic and extrinsic motivation are qualitatively 
distinct, and should not be defined in terms of the same 
underlying conception.
Contemporary Approaches 
Contemporary approaches to the study of intrinsic 
motivation fall under one of two categories^": (1) develop­
mental theories which stress a theoretical account of the 
general and developmental processes which underlie intrin­
sically motivated behavior and (2) social theories which 
stress the self-perceptions or phenomenological mechanisms 
which account for the behavior.
Developmental Approaches
Developmental theories are of two general types and 
have their roots in the same theoretical matrix. White's 
(1959) paper cited above reflects one of these positions.
His is a theory of effectance motivation which emphasizes 
the person's need to have an effective and competent exchange 
with the environment which produces a positive affective 
feeling of competence and self-determination. The theory 
rejects drive-reduction theory and focuses on the person's 
interaction with the environment including such processes 
as exploration, manipulation, attention, perception and
third perspective, the competing response hypothesis 
(Reiss and Sushinsky, 1975, 1976), approaches the issue from 
a behavioristic paradigm. Since its bearing on the research 
in this paper is not as relevant as the social or develop­
mental approaches, it will not be reviewed here.
thought. In young children, White argues, effectance moti­
vation may be quite undifferentiated, whereas in adults, it 
becomes differentiated into more specific motives for mastery, 
cognizance and achievement.
The second of these two developmental approaches is 
incongruity (or novelty or complexity) theory. These ap­
proaches have their roots in Piaget's equilibration theory 
and are best explicated in the works of Hunt (1965) and 
Berlyne (1973). These theories regard human beings as infor­
mation processing systems and assert that intrinsic motivation 
is inherent in information processing. They maintain that 
there is something inherently interesting in the reduction 
of uncertainty and the acquisition of knowledge which is 
inherent in this informational process.
Hunt argues that we acquire various informational stan­
dards through our informational exchange with the environment. 
These standards are compared with the incoming stimulus input 
of the moment. When there is an optimal level of incongruity 
between the input stimuli and the standard of comparison, the 
person will be motivated to reduce that incongruity. In 
other words, this optimal level notifies the person that an 
informational situation exists which activates and directs 
behavior. This model is very simliar to the TOTE unit des­
cribed by Miller, Galanter and Pribram (1960).
This notion of incongruity is comparable to Berlyne's 
concept of collative variables. These are variables that 
derive their meaning from the relationship and comparison of
5receptive input of the moment and residues of past experience. 
In general, they refer to the differences and similarities 
between stimuli (e.g., novelty, complexity, uncertainty, 
or surprise).
Social Approaches
The second general category of approaches to intrinsic 
motivation lies in the social position. Unlike the develop­
mental perspective, these theories do not address themselves 
to the theoretical processes that might underlie intrinsic 
motivation (i.e., competence or the reduction of uncertain­
ty) , but only to the self-perceptions or attributions a 
person makes about why he or she is motivated.
At its most general level, attribution theory deals 
with the question of how an individual gains knowledge about 
the causal structure of the world around him or her. Accord­
ingly, when an individual observes another person engaging 
in some activity, he or she infers that the other is intrin­
sically motivated to engage in that activity to the extent 
that he or she does not perceive sufficient extrinsic con­
tingencies to which to attribute the other's behavior.
However,"according to Bern (1965, 1967), from which these 
social approaches gain their theoretical impetus, the attri­
butions a person makes about his or her self, or processes 
of "self-perception," have a common ground with those he 
or she makes about others, or processes of "other-perception." 
Therefore, Bern proposes that inference processes similar to 
the ones described above will help determine the perception
6of one's own motivation. To the extent that a person attri­
butes the cause of his or her own behavior to some external 
constraint, it is likely that the person will only perform 
the behavior in the presence of that constraint. He or she 
can be said to be extrinsically motivated. But when the 
reasons for performing the behavior can be attributed to the 
activity itself, there is a greater chance that the behavior 
will be self-sustained without the external inducement. The 
person can be said to be intrinsically motivated.
As a result of this emphasis on attributions, social psy­
chologists have focused primarily on the effects that external 
rewards may have on changing intrinsic motivation. Using 
this as a basis, Lepper, Greene and Nisbett (1973) have pro­
posed the "overjustification hypothesis." The hypothesis 
predicts that a people's intrinsic interest in an activity may 
be undermined by reward since it may change their perception of 
why they are motivated. Notice that this hypothesis does not 
concern itself with the definition of reward per se (i.e., if 
reward is defined empirically as increasing the probability of 
response or phenomenologically as producing an internal state 
of satisfaction). Instead, it is concerned with the effects 
that rewards have on attributional processes.
Deci's Integrative Approach
Edward Deci (1971, 1972a, 1975a, 1975b) has attempted 
to integrate the developmental and social positions in his 
theory of "cognitive evaluation." The central metatheore- 
tical starting point for Deci's perspective is the assumption 
that internal states do cause behavior (Deci, 1975b).
7Motives, emotions and cognitions play a central part in ener­
gizing and directing behavior. Deci (1975c) states, "The 
first thing I'd like to emphasize is that the study of moti­
vation is a study of causes of behavior. The process begins 
before the behavior; it energizes and directs the behavior"
(p. 2). Therefore, Deci rejects a purely descriptive defini­
tion of intrinsic motivation as behavior which is motivated 
when there are no apparent external rewards. Instead he seeks 
to provide a meaningful account of the processes that underlie 
these behaviors. Referring to the work of White (1959) and 
de Charms (1968), Deci suggests that intrinsically motivated 
behaviors are ones involved with the human need for being 
competent and self-determining. These behaviors fall into two 
general classes. The first class is behavior that people 
engage in to seek out optimally challenging situations.
This is roughly equivalent to Hunt's notion of encountering 
some optimally incongruent situation. The second class is 
behavior that aims to conquer the challenge. In other words, 
people are involved in an ongoing process of seeking and con­
quering challenges (Deci, 1975b). Thus, while Deci's position 
draws most directly from White, it expands upon Hunt's posi­
tion by considering the concept of challenge rather than 
incongruity.
But Deci also incorporates the social perspective into 
his position. Like Lepper et al. (1973) , he recognizes that 
intrinsic motivation can be affected by the attributions one 
makes about the causes of his or her behavior, or as in
8de Charms's nomenclature, "perceived locus of causality." 
Indeed, most of Deci's research has been devoted to answering 
the more empirical (and perhaps more practical) question of 
what are the effects of extrinsic rewards on intrinsic moti­
vation.
According to cognitive evaluation theory, there are two 
processes by which rewards affect intrinsic motivation. The 
first process is a change in perceived locus of causality.
When behavior is intrinsically motivated, the perceived locus 
of causality is said to be internal. This means that the 
person perceives the cause of a certain behavior to be his 
or her own intrinsic needs. This self-perception may alone 
be enough to influence future behavior and attitudes. How­
ever, when the person receives extrinsic rewards, the per­
ceived locus of causality may be changed and become external. 
The external reward may lead the person to a process of cogni­
tive reevaluation of the activity from one which is intrin­
sically motivated to one which is motivated by the anticipation 
of extrinsic rewards. As de Charms indicated, the locus of 
control or feeling of personal causation shifts to an external 
source, the individual now considers himself a "pawn," and 
views his or her undertaking of an activity in order to obtain 
some external goal. Thus, the person's intrinsic motivation 
is reduced because he or she now believes that the extrinsic 
rewards are the cause of the behavior.
The proposition assumes two important things. First, it 
is assumed that extrinsic rewards have more salience or impact
9than intrinsic rewards (for reasons, Deci, 1975a, admits, are 
at present unclear) and may "co-opt" intrinsic motivation. 
Secondly, if a person perceives the locus of causality to 
be outside himself, he will behave in accordance with that 
perception.
With regard to these propositions concerning locus of 
causality, it appears that Deci's position is conceptually 
identical to those of Lepper at al. (1973). Although re­
stated in de Charms's terminology, cognitive evaluation 
theory, like the overjustification hypothesis maintains that 
a person's perception of why he or she is doing the task 
determines his or her level of intrinsic motivation.
However, because Deci draws some of his theoretical 
stance from the developmental theories described earlier, he 
believes there is a second process by which rewards can affect 
intrinsic motivation: they may change the person's feeling
of competence. Rewards that convey feelings of competence 
increase intrinsic motivation, while those that convey feel­
ings of incompetence decrease intrinsic motivation. To 
explore this issue, Deci asserts that rewards have two as­
pects, a controlling aspect and an informational aspect.
The controlling aspect of a reward aims to control the 
person's behavior and make him engage in acceptable behaviors. 
This control initiates the change in perceived locus of 
causality (as indicated earlier by Lepper et al., de Charms, 
and Deci) resulting in a decrease in intrinsic motivation. 
However, rewards can also provide information to a person
10
about his or her effectiveness at the rewarded activity. If 
the information conveyed by the reward increases feelings of 
competence, there will be an increase in intrinsic motiva­
tion. If the information conveyed by the reward increases 
feelings of incompetence, then there will be a decrease in 
intrinsic motivation. Thus it is suggested that a distinc­
tion should be made between the different kinds of external 
rewards and that the relative salience of the above two 
aspects may determine if intrinsic motivation is increased 
or decreased. The act of reinforcement is seen as an act 
of communication, and the undermining effect of the reward 
may be due to what is communicated (Feingold and Mahoney, 
1975).
It is important to note that Deci is not suggesting 
that extrinsic rewards do not motivate behavior. There are 
certainly countless studies which indicate that extrinsic 
rewards do motivate behavior. However, Deci argues, reward­
ing people extrinsically may have certain unintended conse­
quences on certain internal cognitive processes. Since these 
internal states have a direct relationship to subsequent 
intrinsic motivation, a resulting decrease in the persistence 
of behavior will occur. Again, it is important to'take note 
of Deci's cognitive position which argues for the importance 
of internal events as causal links in understanding behavior.
Different examples of rewards may serve as a useful way 
to clarify the above propositions. Money, for example, 
because of its connotation and use in our society, may
11
suggest to a person that she or he should not perform the 
activity without pay. Because of its salient controlling 
aspect, it will cause the locus of causality for performing 
the activity to shift from the activity to the reward. The 
"cause" of the person's behavior will now lie in the external 
reward resulting in a reduction of behavior when the reward 
is removed. The presence of negative feedback may also 
reduce intrinsic motivation according to cognitive evaluation 
theory. However, unlike money, the reason may not lie in any 
attributional shifts, but because this type of feedback 
communicates to the person that he or she is incompetent.
On the other hand, positive verbal feedback or approval may 
increase subsequent intrinsic motivation. These rewards 
are more likely to increase feelings of competence and are 
less likely to be perceived as controlling behavior.
CHAPTER II
EMPIRICAL RESEARCH
The Effects of External Rewards 
Although the topic of intrinsic motivation had received 
considerable theoretical attention for many years, it is 
only within the last decade that it has begun to be empiri­
cally tested in the laboratory. Parts of Deci's cognitive 
evaluation theory were first tested in 1971 and have been 
elaborated through a series of studies since then.
Deci (1971) introduced a basic tridactic design in his 
initial work in which the behavior of subjects was observed 
during three different periods. First, subjects were given 
instructions to perform a target activity with no mention of 
an external reward. Then, in a second phase, experimental 
subjects were rewarded for the activity, while the controls 
were not. Finally, rewards were removed and the persistence 
of activity was assessed.
The experiment consisted of three one hour sessions held 
on separate days. During each session subjects worked on a 
puzzle called Soma which required the reproduction of two- 
dimensional pictures using three dimensional cubes. Subjects 
were given four puzzles and allowed 13 minutes for each 
session. To minimize the possibility that the Zeigarnik 
(1927) effect would influence later performance, subjects 
were shown the solution' to any puzzle that could not be
12
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solved. During the first session, subjects were told they 
would spend all three sessions using the cubes to form 
various configurations. During the second session, experi­
mental subjects were paid one dollar for each configuration 
they were able to reproduce within the thirteen minute time 
limit, whereas the control subjects were given the same task 
without pay. Finally, in the third session, both groups 
were given more configurations, but neither group received 
pay. The experimental subjects were told they would not be 
paid for the third session because there was only enough money 
available to pay for one of the sessions. To obtain the 
measure of intrinsic motivation in the study, the experimenter 
left the room for eight minutes in the middle of each session 
under the pretext of determining the appropriate configura­
tion to give the subject "based upon his performance up to 
that point in the experiment." As he left the room, he told 
the subjects they could do whatever they wanted, including 
reading some current magazines (New Yorker, Time, Playboy) 
which were conspicuously available. The experimenter then 
observed and timed the subjects behavior through a one way 
mirror during the eight minute free choice period. The opera­
tional definition of intrinsic motivation was the amount of 
time the subjects spent working on the puzzle when there were 
other things to do. Comparisons were made for the changes 
in puzzle working behavior displayed by the experimental 
subjects from the first to the third session relative to the 
controls. The results indicated that experimental subjects
14
showed less intrinsic motivation in the third session than 
they had in the first, whereas no such decrease in intrinsic 
movitation of controls is reported (t is not reported,
2 < .10).
The study is not without its methodological shortcom­
ings. Calder and Staw (1975a) note that during the experi­
mental session prior to the free choice period, there is the 
possibility that the different experimental conditions might 
have produced differential performance by the subjects or, 
as Scott (1975) maintains, different "conditioning treat­
ments." This may have created an uncontrollable variable 
which could have contaminated the results. However, Deci, 
Cascio, and Krusell (1975) present data which show there was 
no significant differences between the paid and unpaid 
subjects on the amount of time they spent working on the 
puzzles or the average number of correct solutions during the 
experimental manipulation phase of the experiment. Since 
there are no significant differences in these performance 
data, little support can be given to Calder and Staw and 
Scott's criticism. Also, results from Kruglanski, Alon and 
Lewis (1972), Ross (1975), and Ross, Karniol and Rothstein
(1976), indicate that performance differences during the ini­
tial phase of the experiment are not necessary to produce 
subsequent decrements in intrinsic motivation after having 
engaged in an activity for external rewards.
A second methodological ambiguity in Deci's study arises 
during session two of the experiment. During this session,
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there was a large increase in the amount of time that rewarded 
subjects played with the task during the free choice period. 
This makes sense, since subjects were now being paid for their 
behavior and as Deci asserts, were probably practicing pro­
blems to increase their chance of earning money. However, 
there is the possibility that the subsequent decrease in 
activity during session three was not due to the withdrawal 
of rewards, but to the effect of satiation or fatique from 
the increased play in session two. However, in studies by 
Lepper et al. (1973), Ross (1975), and Pritchard, Campbell 
and Campbell (1977), the amount of time between the rewarded 
and free choice sessions was far greater than that used by 
Deci. For example, in the research of both Lepper et al. 
and Pritchard et al., this time period was extended to one 
week. In Ross's research, this period was one month in 
length. In all three studies, Deci1s results were replicated. 
It seems very unlikely that fatigue or satiation could 
account for the results using these methodologies.
Finally, one could argue that the decrease in intrinsic 
motivation in Deci's experiment follows not only the prior 
administration of extrinsic reward, but also the withdrawal 
of reward. Thus decrease in intrinsic motivation might then 
be due to the frustration following the removal of the reward 
and not the processes hypothesized by Deci. A study by 
Kruglanski, Freedman and Zeevi (1971) resolves this ambiguity. 
In their study, the experimenters told half the subjects 
that because they had volunteered for the study, they would
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be taken on an interesting tour of the psychology labora­
tory; the other subjects were not offered the reward. The 
results showed that subjects offered the reward were signi­
ficantly less satisfied with the target activity as measured 
by an attitudinal inventory, and significantly less likely 
to volunteer for future experiments of a simliar nature than 
non-rewarded subjects. Notice however, that since the reward 
was never withdrawn from the experimental group (since it 
was only promised but not given), the difference between the 
two conditions cannot be explained by a frustration effect.
A related frustration effect was explored by Ross et al. 
(1976). These experimenters argue that in many of the studies 
testing Deci's hypothesis, the subjects are offered a reward 
but are not given it until they have performed the target 
activity. Such a delay might induce feelings of frustration 
in the subject which become associated with the activity and 
thereby make it somewhat aversive. Thus, the decrease in 
subsequent intrinsic motivation may be accounted for by the 
aversiveness of the activity rather than the attributional 
processes suggested by Deci. This argument would seem more 
valid for children than adults, since children would be 
more likely to experience this waiting period as frustrating. 
To test whether the critical variable is the actual reward- 
task contingency as suggested by Deci, or this frustration 
affect associated with a delay period, Ross et al. assigned 
third graders to one of three groups. In the wait-contingent 
group, subjects received the delayed reward for explicitly
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undertaking the target activity (drawing). Control subjects 
were neither promised nor given a reward and were simply 
asked to wait for the experimenter to return. In the wait- 
contingent and task-contingent condition, the experimenter 
added prior to leaving that another teacher might come in 
and ask them to draw some pictures. He left the room and 
about one minute later, a second experimenter entered and 
asked the subjects in all the groups to draw. This experi­
menter left after about six minutes and the first experimenter 
returned, rewarded the appropriate subjects and displayed 
a number of additional toys as well as the drawing supplies. 
The experimenter explained that there was some time left 
over and that the subjects could play with anything they 
wished. During this 15 minute free play period, the subjects' 
behavior was observed through a one-way mirror. If a frustra­
tion effect was present, subjects in the wait-contingent and 
task-contingent group should have shown less interest in 
the target activity than the control group. If Deci's 
perspective is correct, a decrease in intrinsic motivation 
should have occured solely in the task-contingent group and 
the wait-contingent and control group subjects should not 
differ. The results support the latter hypothesis.- Subjects 
in the wait-contingent group played with the drawing equip­
ment significantly more than subjects in the task-contingent 
group. In addition, the task-contingent condition produced 
significantly less play than the combined wait-contingent 
and control group.
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Thus, although Deci1s original experimental design had 
some weaknesses in its methodology, the studies reviewed 
above clarify these ambiguities and give strong support to 
what might have been equivocal conclusions. Not only do 
they rule out some alternative explanations for the cognitive 
evaluation effect, but each can stand on its own as supporting 
the contention that extrinsic rewards can reduce intrinsic 
motivation.
The Effects of Positive and Negative Verbal Rewards
Another major component of cognitive evaluation theory 
predicts that the presence of negative verbal feedback can 
reduce subsequent intrinsic motivation by diminishing the 
person's feelings of competence and self-determination. In 
a study by Deci, Cascio and Krusell (1973), subjects who re­
ceived negative feedback from an experimenter or through a 
self administered process showed reduced intrinsic motivation 
during a free choice period when compared with controls.
Thus, the data present clear evidence that negative feedback 
decreases intrinsic motivation.
Deci also suggests that the presence of positive verbal 
rewards should result in an ir/crease in intrinsic motivation. 
In a second experiment in Deci's (1971) paper, he explores 
this issue. Using the same tridactic design, verbal rewards 
were administered to subjects rather than monetary ones.
During the second session, experimental subjects were compli­
mented for their performance during session one and given 
positive verbal reinforcement after each problem they solved.
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Experimental subjects showed a significant increase in intrin­
sic motivation from session one to session three relative to 
controls. However, this difference was mostly attributable 
to a decrease in puzzle working time by control subjects 
(182.1 seconds) rather than any increase in puzzle working 
behavior by experimental subjects (who actually decreased 
the amount of time spent on the puzzles by 4.7 seconds).
These results appear to provide somewhat ambiguous 
evidence concerning the effect of verbal rewards on intrinsic 
motivation. Deci (19 72a) employed a more elaborate test of 
the hypothesis using a variation of the original design to 
supplement these early findings. In this design, subjects 
participated in only one session. The first part of the 
session was similar to the above experiment. Subjects were 
asked to reproduce configurations of the Soma puzzle. How­
ever, in the present design, the experimenter left the room 
under the pretext of determining which questionnaire to give 
to the subject based upon the subject's puzzle solving be­
havior up to that point. At this point, the subject was 
observed by a second experimenter who the subject was unaware 
of. Rewards consisted of both verbal reinforcement and 
money.1 A third variable, sex of the subject, helped to clarify 
the results. As in the first experiment, the presentation of 
of monetary rewards significantly decreased intrinsic
■*Tn this study, Deci also tested the relationship be­
tween inequity theory and cognitive evaluation theory by 
varying the timing of the monetary reward. These findings 
will not be reviewed here.
20
motivation. It was also demonstrated that males who had 
received verbal rewards demonstrated significantly more 
intrinsic motivation than males who received no feedback. 
However, females who had received verbal rewards showed less 
intrinsic motivation than females who received no feedback, 
although the difference was not significant. The same pattern 
of results was reported in the research of Deci et al.,
(1973). Using the one session paradigm, positive verbal 
feedback was given to males and females by both male and 
female experimenters. Female subjects who received positive 
feedback spent significantly less free choice time working 
on puzzles than female subjects who received no verbal feed­
back regardless of the sex of the experimenter. On the other 
hand, positive feedback significantly increased the intrinsic 
motivation of male subjects regardless of the sex of the 
experimenter. Deci attempted to integrate the results of 
these two studies into cognitive evaluation theory by 
examining the traditional roles of males and females in our 
society. He argues that the female role is a more dependent 
one and thus females may be more sensitive and dependent 
on what people say. As a result, females may have been more 
dependent on the positive feedback from the experimenter and 
thus reacted to it differently than males. The controlling 
aspect of the verbal reward may be more salient than the 
informational aspect for females. According to the theory, 
this would result in a changed locus of causality and a reduc­
tion in intrinsic motivation. On the other hand, males are
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probably less sensitive and dependent on this type of rein­
forcement and were probably more in touch with the informa­
tional aspect of the feedback. This will result in increased 
feelings of competence and hence, increased intrinsic 
motivation.
In a related study, Anderson, Manoogian and Reznick
(1976) asked four and five year old children to perform an 
intrinsically motivating task (free-style drawing with multi­
colored felt-tipped pens) while (a) expecting money, (b) 
expecting a good player reward, and (c) receiving positive 
verbal reinforcement. A pattern of results similar to the 
above data was found, without the sex differences. Subjects 
in the money and reward condition displayed significantly 
less intrinsic interest in the free play period when compared 
with baseline data. Intrinsic motivation increased for 
verbally reinforced subjects. Intrinsic motivation in control 
groups where time and presence of the experimenter were 
controlled did not change, although there was a significant 
decline in intrinsic motivation in a third control group 
where the child was ignored. This may have resulted from 
the generally aversive atmosphere of that condition.
Other support for this issue, although not as conclu­
sive, can be deduced from the work of Dollinger and Thelen
(1978). In their study, children who received tangible 
rewards (pretzels) showed less subsequent intrinsic motivation 
than children in a control or verbal reward condition.
However, since control and verbally rewarded subjects did
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not differ from each other, Dollinger and Thelen could only 
conclude that verbal rewards will not reduce intrinsic moti­
vation, but not necessarily as Deci predicts, increase it.
Other research has focused on the effect of combining 
verbal praise with a tangible reward. In a study using a 
drawing task similar to that used by Anderson et al., Swann 
and Pittman (1977) found that verbal praise could eliminate 
the effects of a reward. Part of their study involved com­
paring the intrinsic interest of elementary school aged 
subjects given an external reward (a good player reward) 
with those subjects who received the same reward plus verbal 
praise. During a free choice period, this latter group chose 
the drawing activity significantly more often than did the 
former group and spent more time with the drawing activity. 
Thus, Swann and Pittman argued that the addition of a verbal 
reward served to either neutralize the effects of the external 
reward or that the verbal reward may have led the children to 
focus on the informational rather than the controlling aspects 
of the external reward and thus increased feelings of 
competence. Similar findings are reported in the disserta­
tions of Gersh (1977) and Goldstein (1977). In both of these 
studies, a reward group which was also given verbal feedback 
did not show a subsequent reduction in intrinsic motivation.
Thus, there is considerable evidence for the basic ele­
ments of cognitive evaluation theory. The studies reviewed 
in this section demonstrated that the presence of a wide 
variety of external rewards (money, food, and good player
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rewards) resulted in a decrease in intrinsic motivation in 
both children and adults. Although the evidence is not as 
conclusive in both quantity and scope, it does appear that 
the presence of negative feedback will reduce intrinsic 
motivation while the presence of positive verbal feedback 
will increase intrinsic motivation. However, it is important 
to note, that the increase in intrinsic motivation following 
positive feedback, and its decrease following negative feed­
back, may also be explained using traditional reinforcement 
theory. There is no direct evidence that any of the changes 
in behavior observed in the above studies, were due to changes 
in feelings of competence or efficacy. On the other hand, 
there are a number of studies that have dealt more specifi­
cally with the attributional processes which may underlie 
changes in intrinsic motivation. These studies will be re­
viewed in the next section.
Processes of Attribution 
The importance of attributional processes in cognitive 
evaluation theory is highlighted in a study by Deci, Benware 
and Landy (1974). Subjects were read descriptions of an 
experiment which the experimenter had claimed had been con­
ducted during a previous semester. The alleged experiment 
involved a color perception task which required the "subjects" 
(referred to as actors) to color some pictures. Half the 
subjects were told that these actors received $2.50 per hour 
for performing the task, while the other half were told the 
actors received 50 cents per hour. Subjects attributed
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greater extrinsic motivation to actors who received higher 
reward than to those who received the smaller reward, and 
less intrinsic motivation to performers who received higher 
rewards than to actors who received the smaller rewards. 
There was also a negative relation between attributions of 
intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. Thus, if attributions 
of one type of motivation exist, then the tendency will be 
to assume that the other type does not exist or exists at 
lower levels.
This issue is also indirectly explored by Karniol and 
Ross (1976). They presented different aged subjects (kin­
dergarten, first grade, second grade and college students) 
four pairs of stories. Each pair contained one story in 
which a plausible external cause for a target person's be­
havior was in the form of either a parental command or 
promised reward and a corresponding story in which the 
target person performed the same behavior of his own accord. 
The dependent variable was the choice of either the con­
strained or unconstrained target person as the one who most 
liked the target activity. The results indicated that 
younger subjects were more likely to use an additive prin­
ciple (i.e., tangible rewards and parental commands were 
seen as increasing the target person's desire to play with 
the toy) while older subjects basically used a discounting 
principle (i.e., the presence of an external constraint was 
seen as decreasing the target person's desire to play with 
the toy). But even among kindergarten children, 32.14%
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used a discounting model in their choice patterns when lis­
tening to reward stories and 50% used this mode when listen­
ing to command stories. From grade one onward, a majority 
of subjects tended to use the discounting model rather than 
the additive one. Thus it appears that even very young 
children are capable of the attributional processes suggested 
by Deci's cognitive evaluation theory or the overjustifica- 
tion hypothesis.
A study by Pittman, Cooper and Smith (1977) presents 
even more direct evidence that an attributional effect may 
mediate the reduction of intrinsic motivation observed after 
the presentation of external rewards. College students were 
provided with attributional information that was designed 
to either facilitate or inhibit an attribution shift. While 
playing with the target activity, subjects were wired to a 
GSR meter which gave them feedback on their arousal level.
Some subjects were given feedback that their arousal pattern 
indicated that they were interested in the game, thus sup­
plying a cue which suggested an intrinsic attribution. Other 
subjects were given feedback that their arousal indicated 
a pattern similar to people who "are starting to think about 
the money they can win," thus supplying a cue which sug­
gested an external attribution. A third group of subjects was 
given no feedback from the GSR meter. In addition, half the
subjects were rewarded for playing with the task while half 
weren't. A Neumann-Keuls analysis indicated that the Reward- 
No Cue subjects played with the task significantly less than
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the No Reward-No Cue subjects during the free choice period, 
thus replicating the overjustification effect. But more 
importantly, Reward-Intrinsic Cue subjects played with the 
game significantly more than Reward-No Cue subjects. In 
addition, Reward-External Cue subjects spent less time with 
the game relative to Reward-No Cue subjects. However, this 
difference was not significant and hence any interpreta­
tions based on it must remain only suggestive in nature. 
However, the study did demonstrate very clearly that the 
presence of an intrinsic attribution was able to inhibit the 
overjustification effect.
Boundary Conditions of the Phenomenon 
Since Deci's early research, a number of studies have 
been performed which have refined and clarified his original 
findings. These studies have provided important information 
concerning the boundary conditions of the phenomenon, i.e., 
under what conditions can we expect processes of cognitive 
evaluation or the overjustification effect to take place. 
These include parameters associated with the nature of the 
reward and the nature of the task. Each is discussed below. 
Reward Variables
Expectancy. The expectancy of the reward may be a 
significant variable in qualifying some of the earlier re­
sults. In the study of Lepper et al. (1973) cited earlier, 
children who showed an initial interest in a drawing activity 
during the baseline observations in their classroom were 
brought to a separate room and asked to engage in the same
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drawing activity. In the expected reward condition, sub­
jects agreed to engage in the activity in order to obtain an 
extrinsic reward. (A good player reward with a gold seal and 
ribbon.) In the unexpected reward condition, subjects en­
gaged in the same activity and received the same reward, but 
had no knowledge they would receive it until after they fin­
ished the activity. In the no reward condition, subjects 
neither expected nor received rewards. Post experimental 
observations were made seven to 14 days after the experi­
mental condition in the classroom. Subjects were unaware 
that their behavior was being observed. As in the Deci 
studies, the amount of time the subjects spent on the acti­
vity when they could do other interesting things was taken 
as a measure of intrinsic motivation. Cognitive evaluation 
theory would predict that since it is more likely that sub­
jects who expected to receive a reward for an activity would 
perceive the reward as the cause of the activity, the 
expected reward subjects should exhibit less intrinsic moti­
vation during the free play session. This hypothesis was 
confirmed. Subjects in the expected reward condition did 
not spend as much subsequent free time on the activity as 
unexpectedly rewarded or control subjects. A post hoc test 
comparing post experimental interest with original interest 
within each treatment condition was also performed. Subjects 
in both the unexpected and control conditions showed very 
slight and nonsignificant increases in interest from pre to 
post experiment measurement sessions. On the other hand,
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subjects in the expected reward condition manifested a sig­
nificant decrease in interest from baseline to post- 
experimental sessions.
However, Kruglanski et al. (1972) have disputed some 
of the above findings. They asked two groups of elementary 
school children to participate in games against each other.
In one half of the winning teams the members received at­
tractive prizes as tokens of their victory, although no 
prize had been promised initially. No prizes were dis­
tributed to the control subjects. Each subject then 
responded to a questionnaire which included their attri­
buted cause for participating in the games and their enjoy­
ment thereof. These questionnaires were filled out imme­
diately following the experimental session and one week 
later. Subjects who received the rewards (although 
unexpected), attributed causality for having participated 
in the games to the prizes and reported significantly less 
enjoyment of the game with little change one week later. 
Kruglanski et al. argued that the introduction of an unex­
pected reward may result in the subject retrospectively 
attributing the cause of his behavior. These results do 
conflict with the findings of Lepper et al. However, it 
should be noted that different measures of intrinsic moti­
vation were used in the two studies. Also, Kruglanski et 
al. used a different population of subjects, who because of 
their age, might have been more capable of making retro­
spective attributions that preschoolers cannot. In any case,
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it appears that the expectancy of rewards is not a necessary 
precondition for the cognitive evaluation or overjustifica- 
tion effect to occur. Instead, expectancy may just increase 
the causal link between the reward and behavior and therefore 
facilitate the undermining effect of rewards on subsequent 
intrinsic motivation.
Contingency of reward. Another important reward vari­
able which has received considerable attention in the litera­
ture is the contingency of the reward. Although definitions 
of contingency of reward have at times been ambiguous,
Deci's original operations included those situations where 
the subject was rewarded based on some performance criteria. 
Fisher (1978) maintains that these type of contingent 
rewards may be more controlling than non-contingent rewards 
since being paid contingently should tend to continuously 
control the level at which one performs. Non-contingent 
rewards on the other hand, merely control the decision to 
engage in the task and do not influence the level on which 
one performs from minute to minute. In a study by Deci, 
(1972b), one half of the subjects were paid non-contingently 
for performing the Soma task. Each subject in this condition 
received two dollars for participating in the study at the 
end of the experiment regardless of how well he performed on 
the task. No significant differences in intrinsic motiva­
tion between this and the control group were found. Thus, 
there is some support for the contingency hypothesis.
However, as Calder and Staw (1975) indicate) Deci has done
30
nothing but affirm the null hypothesis which does not allow 
for the above conclusions. Deci does, make the results more 
meaningful by comparing them with two cells from an earlier 
study in which subjects were paid contingently (Deci,
1972a). The two experiments were virtually identical in all 
other respects with average earnings in the contingent pay­
ment study being $2.38 per subject. Deci argues that it is 
unlikely that an average difference of 38 cents would 
affect the results, thus making the contingency of the reward 
the critical variable. There were clear differences in the 
pattern of results for the two experiments. When payment 
was made contingent upon performance the subject's intrinsic 
motivation decreased relative to the control group, whereas 
when payment was not contingent upon performance, intrinsic 
motivation did not decrease. Data from Swann and Pittman's
(1977) study cited earlier also supports Deci's contention.
In their study, task non-contingent and control subjects 
chose the drawing task significantly more often than task 
contingent subjects.
On the other hand, several investigations call this con­
tingency 'hypothesis into question. For example, in a number 
of studies (Kruglanski et al., 1971; Lepper et al., 1973), 
the presentation of a non-contingent reward still resulted 
in a decrease in intrinsic motivation. Condry (1977) has 
reviewed a number of studies investigating the contingency 
hypothesis and argues that one difficulty in interpreting 
the contradictory findings is that researchers often use
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the same word to describe different events. For example, 
"contingency" in Deci's (1972a), study referred to payment 
contingent on successfully completing an item. In Swann 
and Pittman's (1977) study, this same term was used to 
describe payment contingent on simply playing with the target 
activity, that is, there were no performance criteria. The 
term "non-contingency" has also suffered from this same 
confusing definitional problem. In Deci (1972b), non­
contingency referred to rewards that were unrelated to the 
task (i.e., paying subjects for simply participating in the 
task). In the work of Lepper et al. (1973), non-contingency 
referred to rewards for doing the task but not explicitly 
tied to a specific performance criteria. Finally, non­
contingency in Swann and Pittman's (1977) study referred to 
rewarding subjects for simply waiting in the experimental 
room for five minutes.
There may be some clarity in this empirical and concep­
tual impasse in the work of Ross and his associates (Karniol 
& Ross, 1977; Enzle & Ross, 1978). Their research indicated 
that the relevant variable may not be so much the contin­
gency of,the reward, but the fact that this contingency 
informs the subject about his or her competence in the task. 
In their studies two types of contingent rewards were used.
In one type, the reward was made contingent on a certain 
performance criteria, such that it provided feedback to the 
subject that he or she was competent at the task. In the 
other type, the reward was made contingent on simply
32
participating in the task. In both studies, only this second 
type of contingent reward reduced intrinsic motivation rela­
tive to a control group. In addition, performance contin­
gent reward increased intrinsic motivation relative to 
controls in the second study.
Considering these results the earlier contingency 
findings can now be reinterpreted. For example, in Deci's 
(1972a) study, it is doubtful that paying subjects one dollar 
contingent on successfully completing an item adds any more 
information concerning competence beyond the subject's 
knowledge that he or she got the item correct. Thus, the 
presence of this contingent reward decreased intrinsic moti­
vation. Similarly, since Swann and Pittman's (1977) 
subjects were simply paid for playing with the task, the 
reward provided no competency information and thus resulted 
in a reduction of intrinsic motivation. The same arguments 
can be made for Deci (1972b), Kruglanski et al. (1971) and 
Lepper et al. (1973). Although these experimenters used 
"non-contingent" rewards in their study, they resemble the 
rewards used by Deci (1972a) and Swann and Pittman (1977) in 
that they provided no competency information for the subject. 
Thus, they too reduced intrinsic motivation. However, in 
the methodology of Ross and his associates, this reduction 
in intrinsic motivation occured only in the task contingent 
conditions. In these conditions, like the ones just des­
cribed, the presence of a reward did little to inform the 
subject about his or her competence. However, in the case
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of the performance contingent condition, the reward did 
inform the subject that he or she was competent at the task, 
and therefore, a reduction of intrinsic motivation was not 
observed. Thus, the issue of contingency of reward is a 
complex one. The term contingency may mean very different 
psychological states for the subject depending on the speci­
fic experimental operations used in a given study.
Norms of payment. Staw, Calder and Hess (1980) argue 
that the inhibitory effect of rewards on intrinsic motiva­
tion depends upon the presence or absence of normative data 
about whether a person ought to be paid for a specific task. 
When a norm for payment exists, as opposed to when it 
doesn't, money may be perceived as more of a part of the 
task itself. As a result, there may be no changes in attri­
bution when the reward is presented and thus no decrease in 
intrinsic motivation. To test this hypothesis, Staw et al. 
(1980) manipulated norms of payment by informing four inde­
pendent sections of an Introduction to Organizational Behav­
ior course that they would be expected to participate in a 
laboratory experiment. In two of the sections, students 
were also told that researchers thought it appropriate for 
students to be paid for their experimental participation, 
thus creating a norm for payment. Students in the remaining 
two sections were told that students were not normally 
paid for participating in laboratory experiments. Subjects 
were then randomly assigned to reward and no reward condi­
tions when they took part in the experiment. The task
consisted of jigsaw puzzles that were previously rated inter­
esting. Subject^ responses to an inventory measuring task 
satisfaction served as the measure of intrinsic motivation.
A significant interaction indicated that the introduction of 
an extrinsic reward decreased intrinsic motivation in the 
target activity only in the condition where there did not 
exist a norm for payment thus supporting the hypothesis.
Salience of reward. Another reward variable which may 
have important qualifying effects on processes of cognitive 
evaluation or the overjustification effect is its salience. 
Ross (1975) argues that the more salient the external reward 
is, the more likely it is that the person will attend to it. 
This will initiate the processes of attribution necessary to 
reduce intrinsic motivation. In the first of two experiments 
testing this hypothesis, pre-schoolers were asked to play a 
drum for either a salient reward (assorted candies), a non­
salient reward or no reward. The salient reward was placed 
under a box in clear view of the subject. In the non­
salient reward condition, subjects were told they would re­
ceive the candy at a later time. In the control group, 
subjects were not promised a reward. The child's drum 
playing was then measured during a free choice situation where 
he/she could also choose from other toys. Compared with 
subjects in the non-salient reward condition, salient 
subjects were less likely to engage immediately in the 
target activity during the free play period. In addition, 
the duration of their performance was significantly reduced
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and they were less likely to report that the drum was the 
best thing in the room to play with. During a second free 
choice period held one month later, the salience manipula­
tion continued to influence duration of drum playing.
In the second experiment, Ross tested the generaliza- 
bility of the initial results by using a different reward 
and two different manipulations of salience. In one (think- 
reward condition), subjects were told they would receive 
marshmellows as a prize and were asked to think of them while 
playing the drum. In the other, (non-ideation condition), 
subjects were promised the marshmellows but were asked not 
to think about them. In a distraction condition, subjects 
were promised the marshmellows but asked to think about snow 
(a three foot blizzard had just occured in the area). The 
purpose of this condition will be explored at a later point. 
In the control condition, subjects were neither promised 
nor given a reward. Comparisons between treatment conditions 
indicated that subjects in the control condition played the 
drum significantly longer during the free period than sub­
jects in the think-reward and the non-ideation condition.
The distraction condition also produced significantly more 
drum playing than did the think-reward and non-ideation 
conditions. None of the remaining possible comparisons 
attained significance. These data clearly support the 
findings of the first experiment. In conditions where the 
reward was salient (think-reward and non-ideation condition) 
intrinsic motivation was reduced relative to the control
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group. Although the salience of the reward was expected 
to be higher in the think-reward condition when compared 
with the non-ideation condition, the lack of difference 
between these two conditions may indicate that subjects in 
the former condition were thinking about the reward on their 
own initiative. More importantly, the distraction condition 
yielded more interest in the target activity than did the 
two salient conditions, presumably because it reduced the 
tendency for subjects to think about the reward while play­
ing with the drum, thus reducing the reward's salience.
A dissertation by Higgins (1977) explores this issue of 
salience in a more indirect fashion. Using jigsaw puzzles 
as the target activity, no significant differences were 
found between rewarded and non rewarded subjects (second 
grade students) during a free choice period. Each subject 
was then run through the experimental procedure a second 
time, but this time the subjects who had originally been in 
the reward condition now received no reward and those in 
the no reward condition received a reward. The measure of 
intrinsic motivation now revealed a significant effect, with 
rewarded subjects completing fewer puzzles during the second 
free choice period. Higgins argued that having the subjects 
engage in the same task twice, once for reward and once for 
no reward, made the presence or absence of a reward a more 
salient variable. Thus processes of attribution were assumed 
to be more likely to occur rendering a decrease in intrinsic 
motivation.
37
Salience may be a very useful unifying concept for 
integrating the various investigations concerned with reward 
variables. An argument can be made that expectancy, contin­
gency and the normative nature of a reward are all features 
of its salience. It is a reasonable assumption that an 
expected or contingent reward is more salient to a subject 
than one which is unexpected or non-contingent. In cases 
where the reward is non-normative in nature, there is a 
greater possibility that it will "stand out" or be more 
salient to the subject. In all these cases, attributional 
processes predicted by cognitive evaluation or overjustifi- 
cation theories should occur more readily.
Task Variables
Task interest. A number of studies have also investi­
gated different types of task variables and their relationship 
to cognitive evaluation theory or the overjustification 
effect. One which has received considerable attention is 
task interest. Calder and Staw (1975b) provide definitive 
evidence that the overjustification effect depends upon the 
initial interest in the task. They argued that when a task 
involves high intrinsic interest, the introduction of exter­
nal rewards initiates the processes of self-perception 
necessary for the overjustification effect to occur. However, 
when a task involves less intrinsic interest to begin with, 
the presence of a reward simply acts as a reinforcer, result­
ing in an increase in intrinsic motivation. In their 
study, male college students were asked to solve one of two
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sets of jigsaw puzzles identical in all respects except in 
their interest value. Subjects in the high interest task 
condition worked on a set of puzzles made up of pictures pre­
viously rated as interesting in a pilot study. Subjects in 
the low interest condition worked on puzzles made up of 
blank sets. To manipulate extrinsic rewards, half the sub­
jects were promised one dollar for performing the task, 
while for the other half, money was neither promised nor 
given. Intrinsic motivation was measured by the subject’s 
response to an inventory measuring task satisfaction. A 
significant interaction between reward and task interest 
resulted. An examination of cell means completely support 
Calder and Staw's prediction. When the task was initially 
interesting, the introduction of rewards reduced intrinsic 
motivation. However, when the task was initially uninter­
esting, the introduction of rewards increased intrinsic 
motivation.
These results were replicated in the findings of McLoyd
(1979) who used his subjects' initial choices of target 
activities to establish initial interest, and Lonky (1978) 
who used, a Piagetian scheme to classify his subject's initial 
interest. In both these investigations, the presence of 
reward decreased intrinsic motivation only for those subjects 
who initially engaged in an interesting task. A disser­
tation by Upton (1973) replicated these findings in 
a field setting. His results are particularly interesting 
since they demonstrate the application of overjustification
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theory to more applied settings. In Upton's study, subjects 
were categorized as either having a high or low initial 
interest in donating blood based on their actual recent 
history of donations. Recruitment letters were sent to 
each of these subjects asking them to donate blood. Half 
of the letters offered a ten dollar remuneration for this 
service, while the other half made no mention of payment.
The dependent measure of intrinsic motivation was the actual 
number of people who showed up to donate blood. A signif­
icant interaction resulted which supported the hypothesis.
The presence of a reward as opposed to its absence resulted 
in a significantly smaller proportion of initially interested 
subjects actually donating their blood. Although not sig­
nificant this trend was reversed for subjects with low initial 
interest. The presence of reward as opposed to its absence 
resulted in a larger proportion of these subjects actually 
donating their blood. Thus, the overjustification effect 
was mediated by the subjects' initial interest in the task.
Task relationship to rewards. In some cases, rewards 
for a given task are inherent to the task content itself, 
i.e., the reward is always associated with the content of the 
task. Kruglanski, Riter, Amitai, Margolin, Shablai and 
Zaksh (1975) hypothesized that in these cases, the presence 
of a reward will increase intrinsic motivation since it will 
result in the person's self-attributed reasons for perform­
ing the task to be in its content as opposed to the external 
consequences. On the other hand, if the reward is extrinsic
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to the task content (or irrelevant), it should decrease in­
trinsic motivation because it will result in the person's 
self-attributed reason for performing the task to lie in 
these consequences. These researchers conducted two experi­
ments using two types of tasks to test the hypothesis. One 
half of the subjects were assigned to a task intrinsic 
reward condition (a "coin toss" game which is always played 
for money in experiment 1, and a "stock market" game whose 
essence revolves around monetary profit in experiment 2), 
and a task extrinsic reward condition (a Soma type game in 
experiment 1 and an athletic game in experiment 2, neither 
of which was associated with payment). Half of the subjects 
in each of the above conditions were paid according to their 
performance. For the other half, no mention of remuneration 
was made throughout the experiment. After the experimental 
session, subjects responded to a questionnaire designed to 
tap their interest in the task. The results in both experi­
ments supported the hypothesis. In the task intrinsic reward 
condition, the subjects manifested a significantly higher 
degree of intrinsic motivation when payment was present as 
opposed to when it was absent. In the task extrinsic reward 
conditions, the subject manifested a significantly lower 
degree of intrinsic motivation when the money was present 
rather than absent. Both of these findings were found in 
both experiments.
The results of Kruglanski et al. (1975) can also be 
interpreted with regard to the findings of Staw et al. (1980)
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concerning norms of payment. Rewards which are inherent to 
a task's content fall into the domain of normative rewards, 
while rewards which are extrinsic to the task's content are 
non-normative. As in the results of Staw et al., only the 
non-normative rewards (i.e., task extrinsic rewards) reduced 
intrinsic motivation. However, as Staw et al. state, "It 
is difficult outside of games with specific rules to know 
when receiving money is or is not inherent in a task" (p. 4). 
Thus, the formulation of Kruglanski et al. "would not gener­
ally provide a theory for predicting when the addition of 
payment will inhibit or enhance task attitude and persis­
tence" (p. 5) .
Other Effects of External Rewards
The most direct and fundamental prediction of cognitive 
evaluation theory and the overjustification hypothesis is 
that external rewards will reduce intrinsic motivation. 
However, some investigations have explored other detrimental 
effects rewards may have on intrinsically motivating tasks 
which are only indirectly implied from the basic theory.
For example, Amabile (1979) contends that an intrin­
sically motivated state is conducive to creativity whereas 
an extrinsically motivated state is detrimental. In her 
study, female subjects were asked to create collages out of 
various materials. Subjects were told to expect or to not 
expect external evaluation of their work. However, this 
evaluation did not present any feedback to subjects concern­
ing their performance. In addition, a focus of evaluation
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variable was also used in the study. One-third of the sub­
jects were told to focus on the technical aspects of the 
activity, one-third the creative aspects, and one-third were 
given no particular focus. One-half of the technical group 
was additionally told specifically which technical aspects 
would be evaluated, and one-half of the creative focus group 
were additionally told specifically which creative aspects 
would be evaluated. The data supported Amabile's hypothesis. 
Each evaluation group except for one, was significantly 
lower on rated creativity than its non-evaluative control.
The one exception was the evaluation group which had re­
ceived explicit instructions on how to make the artwork 
creative. This "behavior modification" group (as Amabile 
referred to it) was significantly higher on rated creativity 
than its non-evaluative control. Thus, Amabile demonstrated 
that extrinsic rewards can cause a decrement in artistic 
creativity, unless specific instructions are given to sub­
jects on how to perform creatively. Other results of 
Amabile's study indicated that evaluative groups rated them­
selves significantly less intrinsically interested in the task 
than non-evaluative controls. Amabile's results mirror those 
of Kruglanski et al. (1971), Lepper et al. (1973) and 
Loveland and Olley (1979). In each of these studies, re­
warded subjects produced less creative responses or poorer 
quality products than subjects who did not receive rewards.
Garbarino (1975) has extended this issue to the realm 
of social interaction, specifically in the way a reward can
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affect the interactive style of an older child acting as a 
tutor for a younger one. Older children (grades 5 and 6) 
acted as tutors for first and second graders by teaching 
them a matching coding task. In the reward condition, the 
tutors were promised movie tickets for successfully teaching 
the task, while in the no reward condition, no such promise 
was made. It was expected that "the effect of the antici­
pated reward (would) organize the subject's behavior and 
motivation around the goal of receiving the reward - to the 
exclusion of interest in the intrinsic features of the task" 
(p. 421). The younger child's errors would be seen as an 
obstacle to the reward desired by the older child. It was 
predicted that the older child's resentment would cast a 
negative tone to the social interaction. The results 
supported this hypothesis. There was significantly more use 
of criticism and demands, and significantly less efficient 
use of time in the reward condition. The no reward condition 
was marked by a more positive emotional tone, greater 
learning by the younger child and fewer errors.
CHAPTER III
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
The studies reviewed so far have focused primarily on 
the introduction of concrete rewards to intrinsically inter­
esting activities (e.g., money, Deci, 1971, 1972a; Kruglanski 
et al., 1975; prizes, Kruglanski et al., 1972; special acti­
vities, Kruglanski et al., 1971; good player rewards, Lepper 
et al., 1973; food, Ross, 1975). Recent studies have ex­
tended the problem to include other types of external con­
straints. These variables are less tangible than some of 
the above rewards, but the more abstract external pressure 
they exert has also been shown to reduce intrinsic motivation.
Lepper and Greene (1975) investigated the effect of 
surveillance on children’s intrinsic motivation. Pre­
schoolers were brought into a room and asked to perform a 
puzzle task which pretesting had suggested was of high 
intrinsic interest. In the expected reward condition, sub­
jects were promised the opportunity to play with a collection 
of highly attractive toys, whereas in the unexpected reward 
condition toys were not mentioned. Orthogonally, .subjects 
in the surveillance condition were told that a T.V. camera 
would be recording their activity whenever a red light was 
on. In the high surveillance condition the red light was 
on for four of the puzzles that the subject worked on. In 
the low surveillance condition, the red light was on for one
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of the puzzles the subjects worked on. For the non surveil­
lance condition, no mention of the camera was made. Following 
this period, all subjects were given the reward. Post 
experimental observations were made in the classes one to 
three weeks after the completion of the individual session. 
There were no significant differences between high and low 
surveillance, and, therefore, these two treatments were 
collapsed into a single condition for purpose of analysis. 
Significant main effects were found for both reward and sur­
veillance, with no interactions between the variables. As 
in previous studies, expectation of a reward was sufficient 
to produce significant decreases in intrinsic motivation.
Of more importance to the current issue, the less tangible 
external variable of surveillance produced the same signifi­
cant pattern of results.
Amabile, DeJong, and Lepper (1976) investigated another 
non-tangible external variable that also appears to reduce 
intrinsic motivation: a deadline. These authors hypothesized
that like money or surveillance, a deadline may cause sub­
jects to view themselves as extrinsically motivated. College 
students were asked to play a game which involved forming 
crosswords using 13 letters. Subjects were assigned to one 
of four conditions. In the no deadline condition, subjects 
were simply told to play with the crossword game as much 
as they wished. In the implicit deadline condition, sub­
jects were told to work as fast as they could but would 
have 15 minutes to work at this task, a time period which
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had proven sufficient for most subjects. Subjects in the 
explicit deadline condition received.instructions identical 
to those for the implicit deadline condition. In addition, 
they were told that they had to complete the games within 
the time period in order for their data to be useful. In 
a work-fast condition, subjects were asked to work as fast 
as they could on the puzzles. This condition was used to 
test the possibility that the presence of a deadline might 
cause an individual to feel pressured to work faster re­
sulting in more fatigue or satiation with the task which might 
also reduce intrinsic motivation. If the performance of 
subjects in this condition during the first part of the 
experiment did not differ from that of subjects in the two 
deadline conditions, their failure to show a similar decre­
ment in intrinsic motivation during the free choice period 
would rule out this alternative hypothesis as an adequate 
account for lessened interest. To establish a free choice 
period, subjects were escorted to another room under the 
pretense of a scheduling constraint. Their behavior was 
then observed through a one-way mirror. In addition, 
subjects were also asked to fill out a questionnaire con­
cerning their interest in the task. A planned contrast 
comparing the two deadline conditions and the two non­
deadline conditions for the free choice time was significant 
and in the predicted direction, although there were no 
significant differences between the two deadline conditions. 
The same significant pattern of results was found for the
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attitudinal measures. Finally, there were no performance 
differences between the work-fast condition and the two 
deadline conditions during the first part of the study.
Since subjects in the work-fast condition did not show a 
decrement in intrinsic motivation during the free choice 
period, the alternative hypothesis of fatigue or satiation 
was ruled out as a determining factor.
Swann and Pittman (1977) have extended the generality 
of these findings by assessing the effect of another type 
of external contraint on intrinsic motivation in children, 
the limitation of freedom of choosing an activity by an 
adult leader. Subjects were either given the choice to play 
with a drawing activity or told by an experimenter that he 
had to start with the same activity. Subjects in both groups 
were positioned such that even in the child-choice condition, 
the drawing activity would be the first choice. During a 
free play activity, subjects in the child-choice condition 
chose the target activity first significantly more often 
than did subjects in the adult choice condition.
Finally, Mossholder (1978) tested the hypothesis that 
assigning an externally mediated goal could also reduce 
intrinsic motivation. Under such conditions, Mossholder 
argued the task is being undertaken to attain a specific 
external end: the goal. Thus the task may have become
valued largely for its instrumentality in reaching the goal 
and not for its intrinsic interest. Indeed, the findings of 
Amabile et al. (1976) may be reinterpreted in terms of this
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context. The time deadline may have been viewed by the sub­
jects as a particular form of a goal. Mossholder also 
argued however, that if the goal infuses some challenge into 
the task, it may increase intrinsic motivation. This is most 
likely to occur when the task is boring, since it will be 
devoid of interest to begin with. The goal would therefore 
provide some element of interest in the task. To test this 
hypothesis, Mossholder had college students work on two 
types of tasks. In the interesting task, nuts and bolts 
from an erector set could be connected to form an asyme- 
trical "erectocar." In the boring task, subjects were 
required to join one type of the erector set parts into 
pairs using three nuts and three bolts. For both task 
conditions, subjects in the no-goal condition were instructed 
to proceed at their own pace. For subjects in the goal as­
signed condition, separate goals were established for each 
of the segments worked on. Using free choice time and atti- 
tudinal responses as dependent measures, a MANOVA revealed 
a significant interaction. All differences were in the pre­
dicted direction. The presence of a goal significantly 
decreased intrinsic motivation for subjects performing the 
interesting task for the behavioral and attitudinal mea­
sures. On the other hand, intrinsic motivation for the 
boring task significantly increased, but only for the 
attitudinal measure.
In summary, these four studies indicate that it is the 
perception of an external constraint itself, rather than the
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particular form or content of the constraint which may ac­
count for the cognitive evaluation effect (Amabile et al,, 
1976). The present research will investigate another 
external constraint that may produce the cognitive evalua­
tion or overjustification effect: competition. Clearly,
provoking a competitive state is quite different than offer­
ing a tangible reward for engaging in a task. However, 
there is one underlying similarity between the two con­
straints, a similarity that is reflected in all the research 
associated with Deci's paradigm. In both cases, it can be 
said that the individual undertakes the task as a means to 
accomplish a specific end. In one case, the end is re­
ceiving the reward; in the other, it is defeating his or her 
opponent in a competitive struggle. Supporters of cognitive 
evaluation theory would speculate that in both cases, the 
person will attribute his or her behavior to the extrinsic 
pressure in the situation, rather than seeing himself/ 
herself as enjoying the activity for its own sake. As a 
result, the person's subsequent intrinsic interest in the 
activity will be expected to decrease.
To test this hypothesis, subjects in the present study 
were randomly assigned to conditions of Competition or No 
Competition. In addition, the Competition variable was 
crossed with a Reward variable to allow the present study to 
be interpreted within the context of past research.
A methodology similar to ones used in the literature 
was employed for the present study. Soma was chosen for the
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target activity since Deci has demonstrated its interest for 
college students. A salient, expected, contingent and non- 
normative reward of money was chosen for the external reward. 
In addition, the reward did not provide any information 
concerning competence at performing the task above and beyond 
the subject's knowledge that he successfully completed each 
item. It was decided that after being exposed to the experi­
mental manipulations, subjects would be unobtrusively ob­
served during a free choice period. Additionally, it was 
decided that interest measures using a questionnaire would 
be taken.
Main effects for Reward and Competition were predicted 
such that Rewarded subjects would show larger decrements 
of intrinsic motivation relative to No Reward subjects and 
Competitive subjects would show larger decrements of intrin­
sic motivation relative to Non-Competitive subjects. Based 
on the methodology of the study, it is difficult to predict 
what may be the result of a combination of the two indepen­
dent variables. Intuitively, it would be expected that sub­
jects in the Competition-Reward condition should show the 
least intrinsic interest, since this condition contains the 
most salient external cues. However, it is possible that 
the two external constraints might provide "redundant" infor­
mation in terms of external constraint. Therefore, the 
combination of the two constraints might not produce more 
"cue value" than each constraint separately.
CHAPTER IV
METHOD
Subjects and Design 
Sixty-four undergraduates from the University of New 
Hampshire took part in the study. All participated for 
about one hour to partially fulfill an introductory course 
requirement. A two by two factorial design was employed, 
with two levels of Reward (Reward and No Reward) and two 
levels of Competition (Competition and No Competition).
Pairs of subjects were randomly assigned to the four cells 
of the design, with eight pairs per cell. Since subjects 
were tested in pairs, it was decided to use only one sex. 
Males were chosen, since it was expected that they would 
more likely respond to competitive instructions than females.
Task
All subjects worked with the task called Soma, distri­
buted by Parker Brothers. The task required the subjects to 
reproduce two dimensional pictures with three dimensional 
pieces. There were seven of these pieces. Each piece was 
shaped differently and looked as though it were made of three 
or four one inch cubes. The seven pieces could be arranged 
into millions of configurations. All items used in the 
experimental and free choice periods of the study were 
identical with those used by Deci in his earlier research. 
(.For a sample item and its solution, see Figures 1 & 2.)
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FIGURE 1 
Sample Item from the Soma Task
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The Solution for the Item in Figure 1
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Procedure
Pairs of subjects were escorted into two adjoining rooms 
by the experimenter. On a desk before him, each subject 
found the following items: a set of earphones through which
all instructions were given, a booklet containing four pro­
blems he was going to work on, a sample problem, solutions 
to the problems, and a set of Soma cubes. The booklet also 
contained a page with a subject identification number writ­
ten on it. Since for both subjects the number "2" was 
written on this page, each subject was under the impression 
that he was Subject #2, and the other subject was Subject #1. 
The reason for this deception will be explained at a later 
point. To the side of each subject, were current issues of 
three magazines. (Newsweek, Sports Illustrated and the New 
Yorker.) Under the magazines were two other problems for 
the Soma task. Both these problems were impossible to solve. 
Both subjects were positioned in front of a one way mirror so 
that the experimenter could observe them from a third room. 
The subjects knew that the experimenter would be observing 
them for the first part of the experiment.
All subjects worked on four Soma problems after prac­
ticing with a sample. Each subject was allowed six minutes 
per problem. Pilot data had indicated that if a subject 
could not solve a problem within six minutes, it was unlikely 
he would solve it within a reasonable time frame. When 
the full six minutes had elapsed, subjects were instructed 
to look at the solution to the problem they were working on.
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Since any subject who was unable to do a configuration 
during the six minute time limit was shown its solution, 
the possibility that the Zeigarnik (1927) effect would in­
fluence the subjects behavior during the free choice period 
was reduced.
During this part of the experiment, the time to com­
plete each problem was measured with a stopwatch. If a 
subject did not complete the task within six minutes, his 
time was recorded as six minutes. The number of items 
correct was also recorded. In addition, while working on 
the task, each subject listened to music through their 
earphones.
Instructions for this part of the experiment were as 
follows:
If you can hear me, please raise your hand. O.K., 
welcome to experiment number one. You may have 
some friends, or you yourself may like to study 
with some kind of music on. During this study,
I will be exploring the effects of music on 
various performance skills under different condi­
tions. Therefore, it is important that you keep 
these earphones on throughout the experiment, 
since you will each be hearing the music through 
them. Please don't take them off until I tell 
you to. Here is a sample of the music you will 
be hearing. (A short fifteen second segment was 
played at this point.) If you heard that, please 
raise your hand. O.K., if you look to the right 
on the desk in front of you, you will see a blue 
booklet. Please open it to the first page only.
The first page has a number written on it. That 
is how I will refer to you during this experiment. 
Subject number one, please raise your hand.
(after a short pause) Subject number two, please 
raise your hand.
Subjects in the Competition conditions were given 
verbal instructions that stressed the competitive nature of
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the task. They were told that the other subject was work­
ing on the same problem and that the experimenter was going 
to compare their performances to see who did better. Sub­
jects in the No Competition conditions were told that the 
other subject was working on a different problem. Using 
the above operations, the variable "Competition - No 
Competition" needs some clarification. The operational 
definition for No Competition includes only those situations 
where the subjects are performing simultaneously on the same 
task. There are other types of non-competitive situations 
(for example, where subjects perform on different tasks). 
Therefore, the variable "No Competition" in the present 
study is just one type of non-competitive situation and 
should not be thought of as the "prototypical" No Competi­
tion condition. In the present study, No Competition is 
defined more by what is absent (competition), than what is 
present.1
Instructions for subjects in the Competition conditions 
were as follows:
During the first part of the experiment I will
be able to observe you through the one-way mirror.
I am going to ask each of you to take part in
Initially, subjects in the Competitive conditions were 
given feedback of how their performance compared to the other 
member of their pair. They were told that on one item they 
had done better, on one item they had done worse, and on 
two items they had done equally well as the other subject. 
This was done to increase the impact of the Competition 
variable. However, this did not prove to be any more effec­
tive than the Competition variable eventually used in the 
present study, so rather than compromise the Competition 
manipulation by having to qualify it, feedback was not used.
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the same problem solving task. You will see the 
materials for this task in a box to your left.
Please take it out now. The object of this 
task is to reproduce two dimensional pictures 
with three dimensional blocks. You may use 
anywhere from two to all seven blocks for any 
puzzle. In the blue booklet, on the page follow­
ing your subject number, you will each find a 
sample problem and its solution. I'd like you 
to study the sample for about a minute and prac­
tice reproducing the picture with the blocks, 
but please, when you each work on the task, 
try to keep all the materials on the black 
cushioned surface since I don't want the pieces 
to get scratched by the table. O.K., take about 
a minute and do that now. (The subjects were 
allowed five minutes to work with the sample.
If they couldn't solve the problem, the experi­
menter helped them out.)
O.K., if you have any questions at this point, 
please raise your hand. Both of you will be 
working on the same problem task. Performance 
on this task has been shown to be a good indi­
cator of a person's problem solving ability.
The reason why there are two of you is that I 
want to compare the results you both make at a 
later point to see who did better.
Instructions for subjects in the No Competition condi­
tions were as follows:
During the first part of the experiment I will 
be able to observe you through the one-way 
mirror. I am going to ask each of you to take 
part in two different tasks, each measuring a 
different ability related to human behavior.
You will see the materials for this task in a 
box to your left. Please take it out now.
Subject number one, the object of your task is 
to form crosswords from the letters facing up 
on the set of thirteen blocks. You may use 
anywhere from five to all thirteen blocks for 
any item. Subject number two, the object of • 
your task is to reproduce two dimensional pic­
tures with the three dimensional blocks. You 
may use anywhere from two to all seven blocks 
for any puzzle. In the blue booklet, on the 
page following your subject number, you will 
each find a sample problem and its solution.
I'd like you to study the sample for about a 
minute. Subject number one, why don't you 
study the different words and practice repro­
ducing them with the blocks. Subject number
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two, why don't you practice reproducing the pic­
tures with the blocks, but please, when you 
each work on the task, try to keep all the mater­
ials on the black cushioned surface since I 
don't want the pieces to get scratched by the 
table. O.K., take about a minute and do that 
now. (The subjects were allowed five minutes to 
work with the sample. If they couldn't solve 
the problem, the experimenter helped them out.)
O.K., if you have any questions at this point, 
please raise your hand. The tasks each of you 
will be working on each measure different abil­
ities. Subject number one, your task has been 
shown to be a good measure of vocabulary ac­
quisition. Subject number two, your task has 
been shown to be a good measure of problem 
solving ability. Performance on one is inde­
pendent of performance on the other, so there 
is no way I can compare your performance.
Each subject in the Reward conditions was told he could
earn 50 cents for each item successfully completed. The
money was plainly in view for subjects in a small box to
his left. The subjects were allowed to take the money
after successfully completing the item. No such reward
instructions were given in the No Reward conditions.1
Instructions for subjects in the Reward conditions
were as follows:
Normally, students are not paid to take part in 
these experiments since they receive academic 
credit. However, I will be able to pay you 50 
cents per item as an incentive for doing the 
task if you get the item correct. Based on my
past experience, this 50 cents per item seems
like a fair price for participating in this 
study with this task. You will see the money, 
in a small box to your left. After each item
Initially, subjects in the Reward condition were 
given 50 cents per item independent of successfully com­
pleting it. However, this produced no differences among 
pilot subjects on the dependent measure. Therefore, the 
current methodology was chosen since it was closer to 
the methodology used by Deci in his earlier research.
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is finished, and if you get it right, you may 
take one fifty cent piece for doing the task.
After receiving instructions which established the 
condition that the subject was it, he was given the follow­
ing instructions with regard to the task.
In the blue booklet that contained the sample 
are also the four items that I would like you 
to work on. Following each item is its solu­
tion. You will have about six minutes to work 
on each item. I will tell you when the time is 
up. If you finish early, please remain seated 
and do not handle any of the other materials.
This may happen since I will wait the full six 
minutes before going on to the next item. When 
the time is up, I would like you to look at the 
solution for the item you just worked on and 
reproduce it if you haven't done so already.
But don't go on to the next item or handle any 
of the other material until I tell you to.
Do you, subject number one or subject number 
two, have any questions? If you do, raise your 
hand and I '11 come to answer them.
Subjects were then reminded of the various contingen­
cies. Rewarded subjects were told:
Remember now, you can get 50 cents per item 
for performing the task.
Competition subjects were told:
Remember now, I will be comparing your perfor­
mances to see who did better.
After six minutes had passed, subjects were told the 
following:
O.K., time is up. Please check over the solution 
for the item you just worked on and reproduce 
it if you haven't done so already. (Competition 
subjects were additionally told: Meanwhile,
I will record each of your performances to com­
pare them. Reward subjects who successfully 
completed the item were additionally told:
You may take the 50 cents now.)
After all four items were completed, Reward subjects
were told:
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O.K., the money you received for performing
the task is yours to keep.
A free choice period was established by creating the 
impression that the experimenter was interviewing one of 
the subjects. After finishing the last Soma problem, the 
experimenter told each subject that he was going to inter­
view Subject #1 about the experiment. Since both subjects 
thought that they were Subject #2 and the other was Subject 
#1, each subject believed he was not observed during this 
period. In reality, the experimenter remained in his 
room and observed both subjects during this period. Pilot 
subjects indicated that this cover story was not believable. 
Since the subjects' rooms were so close together, each sub­
ject could hear the other playing the Soma task. Therefore, 
they expected to also hear the "interview." When they 
couldn't, they suspected a deception. To prevent these 
suspicions from occuring, a method was needed to mask any 
extraneous sounds. Therefore, subjects were initially 
told that the experiment was one on the effects of music 
on problem solving ability. Throughout the experiment when 
instructions weren't given, low key "muzak-type" music was 
played through the earphones. At the same time that the 
experimenter told the subject he was "interviewing" the 
"other" subject, a tape recording of a dummy interview was 
played from the experimenter's room. Responses of pilot 
subjects indicated that this deception was quite effective. 
Additionally, during a post experimental interview, subjects 
reported that the music did not interfere with their work
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on the Soma task. Subjects were told that while the "inter­
view" was taking place, they could read some of the magazines 
left near them, or continue working on their problems using 
some extra items left on the desk from a previous study.
These items were impossible to solve so that if the subject 
stopped playing with them it could not be attributed to his 
solving the problem.
Instructions for the free choice period were as follows:
0.K., for the next part of the experiment, I'm 
going to ask each of you to do something differ­
ent. First I'm going to interview subject number 
1 about the effects of the music. Subject number
1, I'll be in your room in a moment. Subject 
number 2, I'll be with you after I've finished 
to ask you to fill out a questionnaire. While 
you're waiting please feel free to relax and do 
whatever you want to in the room. You may want 
to read some of the magazines I've left near 
you on the table. There are also some other 
pictures of the puzzles you've just worked on 
that I've used in past studies that you might 
want to try. They're underneath the pile of 
magazines. (For subjects in the reward condition 
only: However, I won't be able to pay you for
those.) Or if you want, you can just sit here 
and wait while I interview tljie other subject. I 
should be about ten minutes.
The free choice period lasted ten and a half minutes. 
During that period the experimenter recorded how often each 
subject played with the Soma task with the use of a two
Different instructions for the free choice period were 
initially used in which the subject was not told about the 
opportunity to continue to play with the extra samples. 
Instead, they were left on the table in clear view of the 
subject. However, since this produced such a small amount 
of play with the Soma task during the free choice period in 
all conditions, the final methodology included a verbal 
reference to the sample. This methodology is similar to 
those of Amabile et al., 1976; Anderson et al., 1976; Deci, 
1971; Kruglanski et al., 1975; Ross, 1975; Ross et al., 
1976.
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channel event recorder. This was operationalized by the 
subject manipulating the blocks in a way that attempted to 
reproduce the extra items. Additionally, if the subject 
examined the extra items in a studious fashion, this too 
was considered a measure of intrinsic motivation. One 
member of each pair of subjects was videotaped. This tape 
was observed by an independent observer who was unaware of 
the subject's condition. His observation served as a 
reliability test of the dependent measure.
After the ten and one half minutes had passed, each 
subject was asked to fill out two inventories measuring 
their intrinsic motivation for the task.1 (See Appendix A 
and B for a copy of these scales.) The first inventory 
asked subjects to rate 12 items on a seven point bipolar 
scale. Seven of these items were measures of intrinsic 
motivation,while four were distractor items. The second 
inventory asked subjects to rate the extent they agreed 
or disagreed with eight statements on a seven point
Initially, there was an attempt to test the generali- 
zability of the overjustification effect. To do this, 
before filling out any of the inventories, subjects were 
given the opportunity to read a Scientific American article 
which dealt with the Soma game. They then rated their 
interest' in the article and took a short quiz on the article. 
It was hypothesized that if the overjustification' effect is 
generalizable, subjects performance in the Reward and Com­
petition conditions would be worse on the quiz than the 
performance of subjects in the No Reward and Competition 
conditions respectively. Additionally, Reward and Competi­
tion subjects were expected to express less interest in 
the article. Since no differences were exhibited by the 
pilot subjects, this manipulation was dropped from the 
experiment.
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bipolar scale. Five of these items measured intrinsic moti­
vation, while three were distractor items.
It was also possible that the subject's behavior on the 
dependent measures may have been a function of being observed 
by the experimenter, or by the six minute time limit during 
the first part of the experiment. To test for these possi­
bilities, subjects were asked to rate on a seven point 
bipolar scale these self-perceptions. (See Appendix C for a 
copy of these scales.) As a manipulation check, subjects 
were then asked to rate how competitive they felt during the 
experiment on a seven point bipolar scale. (For a copy of 
this scale, see Appendix D.)
After filling out the various inventories and scales, 
a post experimental interview was used to determine if any 
of the subjects suspected any of the manipulations. (See 
Appendix E for a copy of the questions asked during this 
interview.) After the interview, subjects were debriefed 
and asked not to discuss the study with any of their friends 
or fellow students.
CHAPTER V
RESULTS AND PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION
Subjects Dropped From the Design 
Two subjects were dropped from each cell based on their 
responses to the post experimental interview. In the No 
Reward-No Competition condition, two subjects reported that 
they were being observed during the free choice period and 
also correctly guessed the hypothesis of the study. One of 
these subjects also reported that he and the other subject 
were working on the same task during the experiment even 
though the experimenter had stated otherwise. In the No 
Reward-Competition condition, one subject registered for the 
experiment twice (he was originally used as a pilot subject), 
while another subject stated that he felt that he was being 
observed during the free choice period and also correctly 
guessed the hypothesis of the study. In the Reward-No 
Competition condition, one subject indicated that he believed 
that he would not be allowed to keep the money, refused to 
keep the money, reported he felt that he was being observed 
during t!he free choice period and correctly guessed the 
hypothesis of the study. A second subject in this condition 
reported that he felt he was being observed during the free 
choice period and correctly guessed the hypothesis of the 
study. Finally, two subjects in the Reward-Competition 
condition correctly guessed the hypothesis of the study and
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reported that they felt they were being observed during the 
free choice period. Additionally, one of these subjects 
reported that he believed he would not keep the money, felt 
that the extra samples were impossible to do and stated that 
the music interfered with his performance. All of the anal­
yses of the data was done with these subjects dropped from 
the study, leaving 56 in total, fourteen in each cell.
Reliability Data 
Reliability data proved to be highly significant. 
Correlations between observations made during the free 
choice period and from the video tape yielded a Pearson r 
of .999. However, there was the possibility that since many 
of the subjects did not play with the Soma task during the 
free choice period (a fact which will be explored later), 
these reliability scores were inflated. A second relia­
bility check which excluded whese subjects still yielded an 
extremely high correlation (r = .996), thus ruling out this 
possibility.
Analyses Ruling Out Alternative Hypotheses3- 
Separate ANOVAs were performed on the amount of time 
subjects needed to complete each of the four items of the 
Soma task as well as on the sum of these four times during 
the first part of the experiment (i.e., before the free 
choice period). An ANOVA was also performed on the number 
of correct items obtained by the subjects during that period.
^For all analyses, unless otherwise stated, only signif­
icant levels of .10 are reported.
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None of these analyses were significant indicating that 
there were no performance differences among subjects as a 
result of being in different experimental conditions.1 
These findings replicate those reported by Deci (1975) , 
Karniol and Ross (1976), Kruglanski et al. (1972) and Ross 
(1975). Thus it is very unlikely that responses on any of 
the dependent measures were mediated by performance differ­
ences during the first part of the experiment.
Separate ANOVAs were also performed on each of the two
scales which measured the extent to which the subjects
rated the presence of a time limit and being observed by
the experimenter during the first part of the experiment
as affecting their behavior. In both cases, null findings 
2
resulted. Thus, it is unlikely that either of these two 
variables can account for differences on any of the depen­
dent measures.
Manipulation Check
A significant main effect, F (1, 52) = 25.418,
£ = .0001, for Competition was found for the subjects' 
ratings of their felt competitiveness. For the seven point 
scale, the mean rating for subjects in the Competition condi­
tion was 3.500 while the No Competition subjects the mean was 
5.714. Thus, the manipulation check indicated that competi­
tive instructions instilled greater feelings of competition
■^ For all but one of these analyses, £ > .30. For the one 
exception (the main effect for competition on the first Soma 
item) , £ > . 10.
2
For all of these analyses, £ > .20.
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for subjects than those who did not receive these instruc­
tions.
Analyses of the Dependent Measures 
Inventory Items
A MANOVA was performed using all of the inventory items 
measuring intrinsic motivation employing a two (Reward) by 
two (Competition) design. Findings for responses to the 
inventories will be reported in the following way. For the 
first inventory, where subjects were asked to respond to a 
seven point bipolar scale, the key word which expresses 
intrinsic motivation will be used to represent that contin- 
um. For example, for the continum "Interesting-Boring," 
"Interesting" will be used. For the second inventory, 
where subjects were asked to rate on a seven point bipolar 
scale the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with a 
statement about their interest in the task, the key word 
which expresses intrinsic motivation will be used preceded 
by the word "Agree." For example, for the item, "I felt the 
task was interesting," "Agree Interesting" will be used.
The results of the MANOVA failed to reach statistical 
significance. In spite of these findings an ANOVA was 
performed on all the inventory items measuring intrinsic 
motivation. However, caution should be taken in making 
inferences from this univariate data because of the lack of 
positive multivariate findings.
A significant main effect for Reward was found for 
"Interesting," F (1, 52) = 6.5332, £ = .003. However, the
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results were in the opposite direction from those predicted. 
Rewarded subjects rated the task as more interesting than did 
subjects in the No Reward condition.
A significant main effect for Competition was found for 
"Creative," F (1, 52) = 3.11, £ = .084 which indicated that 
subjects in the No Competition condition rated the task as 
more creative than those in the Competition condition.
However, these results must be qualified since a significant 
Reward by Competition interaction was also found, F (1, 52) = 
5.530, £ = .023). A protected t (Fisher LSD test)^ indi­
cated that No Reward-Competition subjects rated the task as 
less creative than did subjects in any of the other conditions.
A significant main effect for Reward was found for 
"Agree Gift," F (1, 52) = 4.0392, £ = .05. Again, results 
were in the opposite direction from those predicted. Sub­
jects in the Reward condition rated themselves as more 
likely to buy the task as a gift for a friend than did sub­
jects in the No Reward condition. However, a significant 
Reward by Competition interaction was also found, F (1, 52) = 
4.039, £ =  .05, which indicated that subjects in the No 
Reward-Competition condition rated themselves as less likely 
to buy the task as a gift for a friend than did subjects in 
any of the other conditions.
A significant Reward by Competition interaction was 
found for "Agree Inward Desire," F (1, 52) = 3.891,
■^ For all protected t tests reported in this study a 
.10 significance level was chosen to test differences among 
the cell means.
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£ = .054, which indicated that subjects in the No Reward- 
Competition condition rated themselves as less motivated 
by inward desire to choose the task than subjects in the 
Reward-Competition and No Reward-No Competition conditions.
In addition, responses to all 12 items were summed and 
averaged to obtain a summary term for both inventories.
This item was referred to as "Sumscale." An argument could 
be made, that the validity of "Sumscale" depends upon the 
extent to which the 12 inventory items correlate with each 
other. Table 1 provides the pooled within cell correlations 
of the 12 inventory items which gives an estimate of the 
population correlation with between group variance removed. 
Coefficient alpha, which provides the average correlation for 
these correlations was .839, indicating that "Sumscale" is 
a reliable measure. Considering these findings, an ANOVA 
was performed on "Sumscale." The results of this analysis 
revealed a significant Reward by Competition interaction,
F (1, 52) = 4.747, £ = .034, which indicated that subjects 
in the No Reward-Competition condition rated the task as less 
interesting overall than subjects in any of the other condi­
tions .
No significant main effects or interactions were found 
for any of the other inventory items. However, an analysis 
of the direction of the means for the data revealed a non­
significant pattern similar to the above findings. For all 
but two of the inventory items ("Play" and "Agree Outside 




Cell Correlations of the 12 Inventory 
Between Group Variance Removed
Items
1. Exciting
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
2. Interesting .655
3. Varied .381 .339
4. Play .017 .084 -.075
5. Creative .371 .315 .245 -.212
6. Enjoyable .563 .713 .314 .211 .392
7. Satisfying .404 .286 .202 .132 .404 .485
8. Agree
Interesting
.556 .743 .462 .141 .329 .782 .491
9. Agree
Enj oyable




.086 .010 .289 .233 -.203 .060 -.018 .246 .830
11. Agree Inward 
Desire
.491 .468 .017 .113 .346 .609 .332 .407 .410 -.137





intrinsically motivated in the task than did subjects in the 
No Reward condition. For all but four of the inventory items 
("Exciting," "Interesting," "Satisfying," and "Agree Enjoy"), 
subjects in the No Competition condition rated themselves as 
more intrinsically motivated in the task than did Competitive 
subjects. Finally, for all but two of the inventory items 
("Play" and "Agree Outward Pressure"), subjects in the No 
Reward-Competition condition rated themselves as less intrin­
sically motivated than did subjects in any of the other 
conditions. It should be emphasized that although the pat­
tern of these data resemble the significant effects, they 
are ultimately nonsignificant in nature. Thus, any infer­
ences based on these results must remain extremely guarded 
and only be used to suggest possible directions for future 
investigations.
Free Choice Time
An ANOVA was performed on the amount of time subjects 
played with the task during the free choice period. These 
results failed to reach statistical significance although 
nonsignificant patterns similar to the ones found for the 
inventory items were found. Rewarded subjects played with 
the task for more time than did subjects in the No Reward 
condition. Competitive subjects played with the task for 
less time than did subjects in the No Competition condi­
tion. Finally, subjects in the No Reward-Competition condi­
tion played with the task for less time than did subjects 
in any of the other conditions. Again, such nonsignificant
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findings must be analyzed with extreme caution and considered 
as only suggestive of future research.
An inspection of these free choice times revealed a 
large degree of variability probably due to the bimodal 
distribution of the data. (See Table 2 for the distribution 
of scores in the current design.) For each cell, subjects 
had a tendency to play with the task for a relatively long 
period of time or for no time at all. In the Reward- 
Competition condition and Reward-No Competition condition, 
six subjects did not play with the task at all. In the No 
Reward-Competition condition, eight subjects did not play 
with the task at all. And finally, in the No Reward-No 
Competition condition, three subjects did not play with the 
task at all.
Because of the substantial number of subjects who did 
not play with the task at all during the free choice period, 
a chi square test was performed to determine if the fre­
quencies of zero scores were different in the four cells.
This analysis failed to reach statistical significance,
2
x (3) = 3.763, n.s.
Because of the bimodal distribution of the data, another 
analysis, was performed where subjects with zero scores 
were dropped from the analysis. An ANOVA was then performed 
on the remaining data which included a reciprocal transfor­
mat ion of the remaining free choice times. This transformation 
was performed to normalize the time scores, since in general, 







Of Time Played With Soma (In Seconds) 
During Free Choice Period 
For Current Design
Reward NO Reward
605 198 591 0
605 0 567 0
576 0 515 0
600 0 463 0
595 0 331 0
586 0 5 0
378 0 0 0
605 19 609 350
595 0 600 326
595 0 600 90
591 0 600 38
586 0 595 0
524 0 572 0
236 0 567 0
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distribution. When this analysis was performed, no signif­
icant main effects or interactions were found for the 
transformed free time scores.*-
A second transformation of the free choice times was 
also performed to normalize the data. This involved adding 
one to all the free choice times. An ANOVA was then per­
formed on the square root of these scores. This analysis 
also failed to reach statistical significance.
Distractor Items
A series of ANOVA was performed on each of the distrac­
tor items from both inventories. They revealed a significant 
main effect for Reward on the following items: "Hard,"
F (1, 52), » 3.38, £ = .072, "Simple, " F (1, 52) = 7.215,
£ = .01, and "Agree Practical," F (1, 52) = 3.327, £ = .074. 
The direction of these effects indicated that Rewarded sub­
jects found the task more difficult, less simple and more 
practical than did subjects in the No Reward condition. 
Analysis of Subject Subpopulations
Because of the bimodal distribution of the data, it 
was assumed that subjects who scored zero on the free choice 
measure were from a different subpopulation than subjects 
who didn’t. These differences were treated as an additional 
independent variable related to free choice times. In other 
words, a third independent variable was created statistically
*"In addition, an ANOVA performed on each of the inven­
tory items and "Sumscale" with those subjects dropped from 
the analysis, failed to reach statistical significance.
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based on the amount of time subjects played with the task 
during the free choice period. Subjects who didn't play with 
the task at all were statistically placed in one group 
(called Bored), while those who played with the task for 
any amount of time were statistically placed in a second 
group (called Not Bored). Thus, the design of the experiment 
was converted from a 2 by 2 with two levels of Reward and 
two levels of Competition to a 2 by 2 by 2 with two levels 
of Reward (Reward and No Reward), two levels of Competition 
(Competition and No Competition), and two levels of Bored 
(Bored and Not Bored) .
It should be noted that different portions of the in­
structions may have also accounted for the bimodal distribu­
tion of the data. Recall that subjects in the No Competition 
conditions were informed that the other subject was working 
on a task (vocabulary acquisition) different from his 
(problem solving ability). Perhaps after receiving these 
instructions, subjects were expecting a relatively boring 
task based on problem solving ability. The lack of play 
with the task during the free choice period may have been 
due to this expectation. However, in order for this to be 
a tenable, hypothesis, it must be shown that subjects in the 
Bored condition were differentially affected by these instruc­
tions than were subjects in the Not Bored condition. This 
appears to be highly unlikely for a number of reasons.
In the first place, there is no reason to suspect that a 
problem solving task would be perceived as more boring than
76
a vocabulary task. Secondly, the bimodal distribution of 
scores was found in all four cells of the design, not just 
in those where the above instructions were given. Finally, 
subjects in all four conditions were under the impression 
that the task they were working on was a problem solving 
task. Therefore, even if these instructions created an ex­
pectation of boredom, the instructions would have been 
unlikely to have affected subjects differentially.
A second aspect of the instructions may have also 
accounted for the bimodal distribution. In the instructions 
for the free choice period subjects were given three options: 
working on some "extra" pictures of the Soma task, reading 
some magazines, or simply waiting for the "interview to 
finish." Perhaps subjects in the Bored condition were those 
who responded to these instructions only in terms of the 
option involving waiting for the interview to end or only 
in terms of the option involving reading the magazines.
Since these types of data were not recorded during the free 
choice period there is no way of testing the validity of 
this hypothesis. Greater attention to this aspect of the 
experiment should be examined in future research. Again, 
however,, there appears to be no intuitive rationale for 
suspecting that these instructions would have produced the 
observed effects on the subjects during the free choice period.
Table 3 contains the distribution of scores in the 
converted design. The main effects for dependent measures 







Of Time Played With Soma (In Seconds) 
During Free Choice Period 
For Converted Design
Reward No Reward
Not Bored Bored Not Bored Bored
605 0 591 0
605 0 567 0
576 0 515 0
600 0 463 0




605 0 609 0
595 0 600 0










on the free choice measure differed from subjects who did 
not score zero on the free choice measure for the given 
dependent variable. Tables 4 through 10 provide the complete 
ANOVA tables for each of the variables in this analysis.
It is important to note that these analyses were performed 
on this data as if it were an experimental study. However, 
the Bored variable in the converted design is based on 
nothing more than the original dependent measure of free 
choice times which is essentially a person variable. Hence, 
any relationships found in the data must be considered cor­
relational in nature. Thus, no statements of causality may 
be logically inferred from the analysis.
A summary of the most important findings of the above 
analyses fell into one of three main categories: (1) main
effects and interactions related to the inventory items;
(2) main effects and interactions related to the amount of 
time subjects needed to complete the Soma task during the 
first part of the experiment and the number of correct items 
obtained by subjects during that period, and (3) main effects 
and interactions related to the subjects' ratings of their 
felt competitiveness.
A main effect for Bored was found on the following in­
ventory items: "Exciting" (£ = .003), "Interesting"
(£ = .0001), "Creative" (£ = .017), "Enjoyable" {£ = .001), 
"Satisfying" (£ = .035), "Agree Interesting" (£ = .0001), 
"Agree Enjoyed" (£ = .006), "Agree Inward Desire" (£ =
.0001), "Agree Gift" (£ = .002), and "Sumscale" (£ = .0001).
TABLE 4
Summary of Results of ANOVA on Reward, Competition and Bored For: 
Sum of Times For Soma Items Prior to Free Choice Period;
Soma Items Correct Prior to Free Choice Time





Reward 1 .018 .192
Competition 1 2.130 1.698
Bored 1 4.435** 7.722*
Reward X Competition 1 .142 .703
Reward X Bored 1 3.130*** 3.250***
Competition X Bored 1 3.133*** 2.626
Reward X Competition 
X Bored 1 .450 1.484
Error 48





Summary of Results of ANOVA on Reward, Competition and Bored 
For the Following Inventory Items: Exciting,
Interesting, Varied and Play
Source df Exciting Interesting Varied Play
Reward 1 2.768 18.364* .058 .011
Competition 1 .561 1.499 .365 .964
Bored 1 9.442** 16.869* .144 .790
Reward X Competition 1 .079 .201 1.121 1.952
Reward X Bored 1 2.045 5.974*** .088 .001
Competition X Bored 1 . 066 .029 1.040 1.799
Reward X Competition 
X Bored 1 .028 .164 .051 .419
Error 48





Summary of Results of ANOVA on Reward, Competition and Bored 
For the Following Inventory Items: Creative,
Enjoyable, Satisfying and Agree Interesting
Source df Creative Enjoyable Satisfying AgreeInteresting
Reward 1 .884 3.853*** 1.521 3.937***
Competition 1 2.052 .201 .720 .022
Bored 1 6.069** 13.718* 4.723** 14.720*
Reward X Competition 1 4.111 .367 .058 .018
Reward X Bored 1 .377 2.121 .009 1.795
Competition X Bored 1 1.576 .106 .361 .006
Reward X Competition 
X Bored 1 6.864** 2.892** 1.508 .151
Error 48






Summary of Results of ANOVA on Reward, Competition and Bored For the
Following Inventory Items: Agree Enjoy, Agree Outside Pressure,
Agree Inward Desire and Agree Gift
Source df Agree Enjoy Agree Outside Pressure
Agree Inward 
Desire Agree Gift
Reward 1 1.884 1.834 1.322 4.809***
Competition 1 1.006 .018 .026 .255
Bored 1 8.313** .333 67.655* 11.143**
Reward X Competition 1 .088 1.596 2.196 1.314
Reward X Bored 1 .141 .007 .732 7.249**
Competition X Bored 1 .287 .101 .600 .686
Reward X Competition . 
X Bored .353 .001 .007 .474
Error 48
Note: To conserve space, only F values are reported.
*p £ .001
**p £ .01
***p £ .05 M
TABLE 8
Summary of Results of ANOVA on Reward, Competition and Bored
For the Following Inventory Items: Sumscale, Hard,
Simple, Passive and Intuitive
Source df Sumscale Hard Simple Passive Intuitive
Reward 1 4.309*** 3.330**** 7.546** .517 .837
Competition 1 .005 .022 .703 1.244 1.595
Bored 1 29.915* 2.609 .002 .179 1.626
Reward x Competition 1 1.846 1.751 1.911 .100 .112
Reward x Bored 1 1.882 .429 1.188 .243 .835
Competition X Bored 1 .034 3.208**** 5.610*** .447 1.526 .
Reward X Competition 
X Bored 1 .556 .005 .001 .663 .500
Error 48




***p < .05 w
****p <_ .10
TABLE 9
Summary of Results of ANOVA on Reward, Competition and Bored For
the Following Inventory Items: Clear, Agree Important,
Agree Valuable and Agree Practical





Reward 1 .740 .196 .260 4.030*
Competition 1 2.312 1.200 1.761 1.678
Bored 1 .822 .007 .380 4.639*
Reward X Competition 1 .002 .449 .038 .157
Reward X Bored 1 .168 1.038 .023 .375
Competition X Bored 1 .159 .125 .756 .1337
Reward X Competition 
X Bored 1 1.145 4.269* 6.777* 4.202*
Error 48
Note: To conserve space, only F values are reported.
TABLE 10
Summary of Results of ANOVA on Reward, Competition and Bored
For the Following Items: Competition Check,
Observation Check and Time Limit Check
Source df Competition Check Observation Check Time Limit Check
Reward 1 .005 1.548 .706
Competition 1 32.253* 1.127 .601
Bored 1 3.657 . 861 .056
Reward X Competition 1 .123 . 853 .071
Reward X Bored 1 1.120 1.167 .874
Competition X Bored 1 7.782 1.461 .954
Reward X Competition 
X Bored 1 .182 .304 .026
Error 48






In all these analyses, subjects who were in the Bored 
condition rated the task as less intrinsically motivating 
than did subjects in the Not Bored condition.
For some of the above results, the final interpreta­
tion of the data has to be qualified because of interactions 
involving the Bored variable. These interactions were as 
follows: For "Interesting," a significant Bored by Reward
interaction (£ = .018) was reported which indicated that 
Not Bored-Reward subjects rated the task as more interesting 
than Bored-No Reward subjects.1 For "Creative," a three way 
interaction was significant (£ = .012) which indicated that 
Bored-Reward-No Competition subjects rated the task as less 
creative than did Bored-No Reward-No Competition subjects.
For "Agree Gift," a Bored by Reward interaction was signifi­
cant (£ = .01) which indicated that Bored-No Reward subjects 
rated themselves as less likely to buy the task as a gift 
for a friend than did subjects in any of the other conditions.
A summary of the above findings indicated that Bored 
subjects consistently rated the task as less intrinsically 
motivating than did subjects in the Not Bored condition. The 
interactions involving the Bored variable were not as clearly 
consistent. The task was rated as less creative by Bored-No 
Competition subjects when a reward was present than when it 
was absent. However, the absence of a reward resulted in the
1As in the earlier analyses, a protected t test was 
used to test all differences among means for significant 
interactions. A probability level of .10 was chosen to 
test for significance.
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Bored subjects rating themselves as less likely to buy the 
task as a gift for their friend than subjects in any of the 
other conditions. In addition, the absence of a reward 
resulted in the Bored subjects rating the task as less inter­
esting than Bored subjects in Reward conditions.
An ANOVA was also performed on the sum of the amount 
of time subjects needed to complete the four items of the 
Soma task during the first part of the experiment. The same 
analysis was performed on the number of items successfully 
completed by subjects during that same time period. A 
significant main effect for Bored resulted which indicated 
that Bored subjects needed more time to solve the puzzles 
(■£ = .04) and successfully completed less items (£ = .008) 
than did subjects in the Not Bored condition. However, these 
results must also be qualified because of significant inter­
actions. For total time needed to solve the original four 
items, a significant Bored by Competition interaction 
(£ = .083) resulted which indicated that Bored-No Competition 
subjects needed more time to solve the puzzles than did 
subjects in any of the other conditions. Additionally, a 
significant Bored by Reward interaction (£ = .083) resulted 
which indicated that Bored-Reward and Bored-No Reward sub­
jects needed more time to solve the problems than Not Bored- 
Reward subjects. For the amount of items correct, a signi­
ficant Bored by Reward interaction (£ = .008) resulted which 
indicated that Bored-Reward subjects successfully completed 
less items than did Not Bored-Reward and Not Bored-No Reward
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subjects, and Bored-No Reward subject successfully completed 
less items than did Not Bored-Reward subjects.
Finally, significant main effects for Bored (£ = .062) 
and Competition (£ = .0001) was found for subjects ratings 
of felt competitiveness. Examination of these findings 
indicated that Bored and Competition subjects rated them­
selves as feeling more competitive than did Not Bored and No 
Competition subjects respectively. Additionally, a signif­
icant Bored by Competition interaction (£ = .008) resulted 
which indicated that Bored-Competition subjects rated 
themselves as feeling more competitive than did subjects in 
all other conditions, and that Not Bored-Competitive sub­




According to the model proposed in the current research, 
the presence of an external reward or competition should have 
reduced intrinsic motivation. In general, such predictions 
were not confirmed. A significant main effect for Reward was 
found for only two of the inventory items and these were in 
the opposite direction as predicted. In addition, an exam­
ination of the means for the remaining dependent measures 
(the 12 inventory items, "Sumscale," and the free choice 
times) revealed a similar nonsignificant pattern of means 
except for two of the inventory items. Thus, there is no 
indication that the present research replicated past find­
ings in which external rewards reduced intrinsic motivation.
There was some limited support that the presence of 
competition reduces intrinsic motivation. A significant 
main effect (although tempered by an interaction) was found 
for one inventory item in the direction predicted by the 
theory. In addition, an examination of the means for the 
remaining dependent measures revealed a similar nonsignificant 
pattern of means except for four of the inventory items.
An analysis of the subpopulation data also provided some 
support that the presence of competition reduces intrinsic 
motivation. Bored subjects rated themselves as significantly 
more competitive than those subjects considered as being in
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the Not Bored condition. In other words, there was a signif­
icant relationship between the amount of time subjects
¥
played with the task during the free choice period and their 
subjective ratings of competiveness. Subjects who did not 
play with the task at all during this period tended to rate 
themselves as feeling more competitive than did subjects who 
played with the task for any period of time. It should be 
noted that there was also a significant Competition by Bored 
interaction in these data. However, the nature of this inter­
action simply showed that subjects rated themselves as feeling 
more competitive in any of the cells where they received 
competitive instructions than those cells in which they didn't. 
Such a pattern of cell means was to be expected, since the 
dependent measure in this case was also a manipulation check 
for the competitive instructions. As such, this interaction 
does not constrain the present interpretation of the sub­
population data. However, as stated earlier, the Bored 
variable in the current study is based on nothing more than 
the original dependent measure of free choice time. Hence, 
any interpretations based on the above findings must be 
considered correlational in nature.
Other data found in the study, which are experimental in 
nature are compatible with the above findings. Indeed, the 
most consistent significant pattern found in the data, a 
Reward by Competition interaction, indicated that No Reward- 
Competition subjects found the task less intrinsically moti­
vating than did subjects in any of the other conditions. For
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three of the inventory items and "Sumscale" this pattern 
was significant. In addition, subjects in the No Reward- 
Competition condition showed less intrinsic motivation than 
did subjects in any of the other conditions as measured by 
all the dependent measures except two of the inventory items. 
This particular order of cell means indicated that the pre­
sence of competition reduced intrinsic motivation as long as 
it was not coupled with a reward.
Another possible interpretation of the free choice 
data comes from considering the subject's initial success 
with the Soma task. An examination of the subpopulation data 
indicated that Bored subjects needed significantly more time 
to successfully complete the four items of the Soma task 
during the first part of the experiment than did subjects in 
the Not Bored condition. There was also a significant Bored 
by Reward and Bored by Competition interaction. However, an 
examination of cell means indicated there were no cases 
where Not Bored subjects needed more time than Bored subjects 
to successfully complete the task. This was true for any 
level of the Reward or Competition variable. Additionally, 
Bored subjects solved significantly less items correctly 
than subjects in the Not Bored condition. Here too, there 
was a significant Bored by Reward interaction. However, an 
examination of cell means indicated there were no cases where 
Bored subjects solved more problems than did subjects in the 
Not Bored condition. This was true for any level of the 
Reward variable. In other words, subjects who played with
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the task for some period of time during the free choice period 
were more successful with the task originally than were sub­
jects who did not play with the task at all. These findings 
are quite consistent with Deci's original conception of intrin­
sic motivation. It could be argued that in the present 
study, differences in intrinsic motivation during the free 
choice period, were due to differences in feelings of compe­
tence generated by early success with the task during the 
initial phase of the experiment. However, it is again impor­
tant to emphasize that this data is essentially correlational 
in nature. Subjects placed in the Bored group are essentially 
different people than those placed in the Not Bored group 
(vis a vis their performance on the Soma task). Therefore, 
the above correlational relationship between success on the 
task and intrinsic motivation during the free choice period 
may be mediated by an unknown third variable. As such, all 
conclusions must remain merely suggestive in nature. However, 
future research could consider the subjects' competence with 
the task in a more systematic fashion. Conditions of compe­
tence could be established through the use of different 
levels of competency feedback; or, a preexperimental measure 
of the subjects' initial competency with the task could 
serve as a potential covariate. It is unfortunate that the 
current methodology precludes this possibility since indivi­
dual differences in competence were established under differ­
ent experimental conditions. However, the subpopulation data 
cited above certainly indicates the potential relevance of
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competency for the cognitive evaluation effect.
In summary, the present research suggests that the 
presence of competition may be able to reduce intrinsic moti­
vation. However, there was no support for the contention 
that the presence of an external reward will reduce intrin­
sic motivation. Indeed, in the present study, the presence 
of a reward seemed to nullify the detrimental effects of 
competition. These results are particularly surprising, 
since the current research replicated the basic methodology 
of past studies which successfully demonstrated the over­
justification effect. The discussion which follows focuses 
on the failure to replicate this effect. It will be pri­
marily concerned with methodological issues, some specific 
to the present study and some having a broader scope.
However, these inevitably post hoc interpretations are for 
the most part educated second guesses. While fully cogni­
zant of this problem, such speculation provides the foundation 
for future improvements in a programatic research program.
One problem in the current study, may have been a lack 
of certainty by the subject that he would be permitted to 
keep the monetary reward. Without this belief, the attri- 
butional processes needed to initiate the overjustification 
effect would never have taken place. To assess whether 
subjects felt they would keep the money, they were asked 
quite directly during the post experimental interview if 
they felt that the money earned during the experiment was 
theirs to keep. Only two subjects responded negatively to
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this question and they were subsequently dropped from the 
analysis. However, it is possible that the remaining sub­
jects assumed they could keep the reward only at the point 
when asked the question during the post experimental inter­
view. The demands during the interview may have favored 
such a response— the experiment was over, the subject prob­
ably felt relaxed, and the experimenter had not asked for 
any of the money to be returned. At this point, it is 
doubtful that the subject would suspect the experimenter's 
original claim about keeping the money. However, this might 
not have been the case during the actual experimental 
session. Subjects might have found it quite unusual to be 
paid for participating in an experiment for which they were 
also to receive academic credit. Indeed, although subjects 
were instructed to take the 50 cent piece for each item 
they successfully completed, few actually did. Even after 
the free choice period was over, most subjects left the 
money they earned in the box in front of them. It was only 
during the post experimental interview that most of the sub­
jects physically took possession of the money. Therefore, 
it is possible that during the experiment, subjects doubted 
they were actually going to keep the money and were only . 
finally convinced during the post experimental interview.
If this was the case, the attributional processes needed to 
initiate the overjustification effect would never have taken 
place. It is important to note that the above arguments 
must remain speculative in nature. Indeed, there is some
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evidence that subjects did respond to the Reward variable as 
indicated by the main effect for Reward on two of the inven­
tory items. However, these results are by no means definitive, 
and so the above discussion remains as a viable criticism 
of the current methodology.
To deal with this potential methodological weakness, 
subjects must be clearly convinced that they can keep any 
monetary reward when it is initially presented. One possible 
strategy for accomplishing this would utilize the sign-up 
sheets used by subjects to register for different experi­
ments. These sign-up sheets are usually posted on bulletin 
boards and provide such details as the time and place of an 
experiment. For a future study, it might prove advantageous 
if these sheets also provided information concerning pay­
ment. Half the sign-up sheets would indicate that partici­
pating in the study could result in the winning of a mone­
tary reward, while the remaining sheets would include no such 
statement. It would be expected that after registering on 
such a sign-up sheet, the subject would be more inclined to 
believe he would keep any money earned during the actual 
experiment. In addition, such a procedure would increase 
the possibility that the subject would attribute his reason 
for participating in the experiment to the monetary reward 
rather than an academic requirement. Of course, an argument 
could be made that such a registration process would not 
guarantee a random assignment of subjects to the different 
Reward conditions. However, this is very doubtful since it
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is very likely that all possible subjects would be predis­
posed to register for the Reward condition. In other words, 
the actual assignment of subjects to the various conditions 
would be more a function of who got to the Reward sign-up 
sheet first, rather than any selection bias.
A second explanation for the lack of positive results 
for the Reward variable may lie in the subject’s initial 
interest in the Soma task. Studies reviewed earlier 
(Calder & Staw, 1975b; Lonky, 1978; McLoyd, 1979; Upton,
1973) indicated that a necessary precondition for the over­
justification effect is an initial interest in the target 
activity. If the target activity is of low initial interest, 
a reinforcement effect is likely to occur. This may have 
been the case in the present study. On a purely intuitive 
level, it is not unreasonable to assume that the Soma task 
might have not been a very interesting task for the sub­
jects in the present experiment. Subjects may have found 
the task too simple and lacking any challenge to stimulate 
their interest. Indeed, there may be some empirical justi­
fication for this premise. Subjects in the present study 
worked with the same Soma items as did those in Deci's 
(1971, 1972a) earlier research. However, an examination of 
the pertinent available data from Deci's research indicated 
that his subjects may have found the task more difficult 
than those in the present study. Subjects in Deci's (1971) 
study correctly solved an average of 2.38 items in the Reward 
condition. Subjects in the Reward-No Competition condition
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of the present study (which is conceptually similar to 
Deci's Reward subjects) correctly solved an average of 
2.79 items. Additionally, prior to the free choice period 
in Deci's 1971 study, Rewarded subjects needed an average of 
372.5 seconds to solve each item. For No Reward subjects, 
428.4 seconds per item was needed. In his 1972a study, sub­
jects in the Reward condition which was similar to the one 
in the present study, needed an average of 314.2 seconds to 
solve each item. In the Control condition, an average of 
307.7 seconds per item was needed. In comparable cells in 
the present study, subjects needed an average of 189 seconds 
(Reward-No Competition condition) and 180 seconds (No 
Reward-No Competition condition) to solve each item. Thus, 
Deci's subjects needed more time and successfully completed 
less items than subjects working on the same task in the 
current study. This may indicate that Deci's subjects 
found the task more difficult, more challenging, and there­
fore probably more intrinsically motivating to begin with 
than did subjects in the present study. Perhaps for the 
subjects in the present study, the task was not initially 
interesting enough for the overjustification effect to mani­
fest itself. Indeed, the reinforcement pattern observed in 
some of the data is quite consistent with this assumption.
An examination of the free choice data also supports 
the above premise. Recall that free choice instructions 
reminded subjects that they could continue to work with the 
Soma task during this period. This reminder was included,
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since without it, pilot subjects did not play with the task 
during the free choice period. Yet despite the possible 
demands initiated by these instructions in the experimental 
situation, 23 subjects did not play with the task for any 
period of time during the free choice period. This is one 
less than 50 percent of all the subjects in the study. This 
indifference to the Soma task during the free choice period 
may be an indication of the lack of initial interest for 
the task.
In line with the above argument, it is interesting to 
note that two of the distractor items ("Hard" and "Simple") 
resulted in significant main effects for Reward. Rewarded 
subjects rated the task as more difficult and less simple 
than did subjects in the No Reward condition. Perhaps in 
this study, because of the lack of initial interest in the 
task, the presence of a reward convinced the subjects that 
the task was more difficult, and thus more challenging and 
intrinsically motivating. Otherwise, the subjects may have 
wondered why they were being paid. This explanation could 
also account for the pattern among Rewarded subjects to play 
with the task for a longer period of time and to rate it as 
more intrinsically motivating than did subjects in the No 
Reward condition.
Future research should more clearly consider the sub­
ject's initial interest in the task. There are various 
methodologies which can accomplish this. For example,
Calder and Staw (1975b) presented subjects with tasks that
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were previously assessed as being interesting or not inter­
esting. McLoyd (1979) used his subject's initial choice of 
target activities to establish initial interest. Upton 
(1973) used his subject's actual history with the target 
activity to determine initial interest. Another strategy 
for dealing with this issue might consider the subject's 
initial interest in the task as a possible covariate. Base­
line measures obtained during preexperimental situations 
would be assumed to be the subject's initial interest in 
the task. With this information in hand, methodologies 
similar to that used in the present study could be employed 
with initial interest statistically controlled.
Finally, the lack of positive findings for Reward in the 
present study may suggest that the theory of cognitive eval­
uation or overjustification are simply not valid hypotheses.
Of course, since the most general pattern in the data en­
tailed accepting the null hypothesis, such deductions cannot 
be legitimately made. However, a number of recent unpub­
lished dissertations also produced null findings. The 
specific components of these various studies differed from 
each other and the present research because of unique focuses 
of interest. However, each included elements of the basic 
paradigm where an external reward was offered to the subjects 
for engaging in the target activity. For example, in a 
study by Effron (1976), various categories of external incen­
tives (performance contingent incentives, competency feedback, 
performance contingent incentives plus competency feedback,
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task contingent incentives, and performance contingent 
incentives which suggested superior performance) failed to 
produce the overjustification effect. Subjects who volun­
teered for a study by Palmer (1977) showed no decrement in 
intrinsic motivation for a reading activity when rewarded 
with money. Parish (1976) replicated the methodology of 
Lepper et al. (1973) using trinkets as a reward and found 
no significant effects for third graders. Campbell (1976) 
rewarded groups of children each consisting of five, three, 
or two subjects. No subsequent decrease in intrinsic moti­
vation was reported. Kesselman (1975) and Cohen (1974) 
found that monetary reward did not impair intrinsic motivation 
for a hidden word task. In addition, verbal reward did not 
enhance intrinsic motivation in Cohen's study. Schooler 
(1976) rewarded subjects for either participating in a low 
interest task (listening to the repetitive recording of a 
human voice) or high interest task (listening to music).
One group of subjects rewarded themselves in terms of what 
they felt they deserved for listening to the target activity.
A second group was yolked to this group and received the 
same amount of reward. A control group received no reward.
No significant main effects or interactions were reported.
Witt (1975) reported similar findings. There was no subse­
quent decrement in intrinsic motivation for high or low 
interest groups when given an unexpected or expected reward.
Thus, a number of unpublished studies report very dif­
ferent findings than those described in the published
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literature. One set of results seems to indicate that the 
overjustification effect is a viable hypothesis, while the 
other set provides very little supporting evidence. The 
critical question is why do studies using very similar 
methodologies produce very different results and conclusions.
The solution to this empirical and conceptual incon­
sistency may be related to an extremely significant issue 
which has received the attention of a number of psychologists. 
This concern has taken the form of questioning the adequacy 
of traditional research strategies for dealing with beha­
vioral phenomenon at a sufficient level of complexity where 
generalizations can be made beyond the experimental situa­
tion (Petrinovich, 1979). This issue has been explored by 
Campbell and Stanley (1963) in terms of external and internal 
validity. Internal validity refers to the procedures and 
safeguards the psychologist must employ to assure carefully 
controlled experimental conditions. External validity, on 
the other hand, raises the question of the generalizability 
of the results. To establish external validity, it becomes 
important to select representational samples of subjects and 
experimental situations.
It is this last point which may be critical in attempt­
ing to integrate the absence of positive results for the 
present and previously reviewed dissertations with those 
found in the published literature. It may be the case that 
the extreme fine tuning of experimental operations found in 
this and most research designs may seriously limit real
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world phenomena from manifesting themselves. Wiggins (1973) 
has stated that "the laws which govern the isolated frag­
ments of behavior studied in the contrived laboratory situa­
tions may be of a different order than the laws which govern 
behavior in many complex natural situations" (p. 4).
Brunswick (1956) noted many years ago that traditional 
systematic designs almost inevitably involve the use of 
atypical situations for the behavior in question and explore 
this behavior in an atypical context.
These arguments seem to suggest that if the experimental 
procedures do not adequately characterize the ecological 
context of the phenomenon under question, even the most 
rigorously controlled operations may fail to produce re­
sults. This may have been the case in the present study.
In an attempt to test the overjustification hypothesis, 
ratings of inventory items and free choice times served as 
dependent measures under various conditions of reward and 
competition. The operational definitions of these different 
variables clearly met the requirement of an internally valid 
study. However, the choice of these particular operational 
definitions was in some sense ultimately arbitrary. It is 
this "arbitrariness" which may be the weakest link in the 
current methodology. For example, does the playing with the 
Soma task during an academically required activity, truly 
characterize the nature of intrinsic motivation found in 
naturalistic settings? Does such an experience resemble 
the curiosity of the exploring preschooler, the high school
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student who incessantly reads his or her encyclopedia, or 
the distinguished scientist who devotes half a lifetime to 
solve what for most would be an extremely difficult and 
complex problem? In a similar fashion, does the presenta­
tion of a two dollar reward to college freshman fulfilling 
an academic obligation which required one hour of their time 
truly resemble the detrimental effect that twelve years of 
grading may have on a student's intrinsic motivation? There 
is no way of absolutely knowing the answers to these ques­
tions, but it is a strong possibility that the operations 
used during this experiment (and perhaps in the disserta­
tions previously reviewed) may have violated the integrity 
of the phenomenon being studied. The lack of external 
validity in the present study may have prevented the over­
justification effect from manifesting itself.
The issues raised above are not only limited to in­
vestigators of the overjustification effect. Indeed, the 
field of experimental psychology will continue to labor 
under a limited context until solutions to these method­
ological problems are developed. Perhaps a step in the 
direction of those solutions is provided by a methodological 
approach emphasizing the experimental analysis of.behavior 
using a single-subject design (Robinson & Foster, 1979).
This approach departs from traditional large-N experimenta­
tion where many subjects are assigned to different conditions, 
and statistical procedures are used to infer differences 
between groups. Single-subject designs involve intrasubject
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comparisons where each subject serves as his or her own 
control. These comparisons are made by focusing on the 
subject's behavior before and during the administration of 
a given independent variable and after its removal.
The relevance of single-subject designs to the discus­
sion of ecological validity rests in the choice of a depen­
dent measure. In most single-subject designs, this involves 
an initial period of observation where accurate measurement 
of the natural frequency of the target behaviors under study 
are made (Hersen & Barlow, 1976). These initial assessments 
are not necessarily limited to a single behavior but may 
involve multiple dependent measures. A crucial element in 
the choice of these dependent measures involves observing 
the subject in his or her natural setting. Thus, one strong 
feature of this methodological approach is that the integrity 
of the phenomenon in its natural setting is preserved.
It is also important that the stability and range of 
variability of these target behaviors be fully examined.
Once stable and consistent behavioral patterns begin to 
emerge, these dependent measures may be considered an appro­
priate target for experimentation. At this point, the inde­
pendent variable of interest may be administered to the 
subject. Differences between target behaviors before and 
after this administration are compared and logical deductions 
can be made. To increase the base for generalization from 
a single-subject design, the same experimental procedure may 
be replicated using different subjects (.Hersen & Barlow, 1976) .
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The single-subject design allows for the systematic 
study of the phenomenon in its ecological context. It also 
allows for the systematic application of experimental proce­
dures to the behavior under question. This synthesis of 
these two broadly different methodological traditions may 




COPY OF THE FIRST INVENTORY MEASURING 
INTRINSIC MOTIVATION
Below are a number of rating scales on which you are to in­
dicate your impression of the task you just worked on. Please 
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COPY OF THE SECOND INVENTORY MEASURING 
INTRINSIC MOTIVATION
Below is ,a number of statements about how you might have 
felt about the task you just worked on. Below each state­
ment is a scale which measures the extent to which you agree 
or disagree with the statement. Please place an X on any 
point on the scale which would be a good indication of how 
much you agree or disagree with the statement.
I found the task to be important. 
STRONGLY DISAGREE
1 2  3 4
I felt the task was interesting. 
STRONGLY DISAGREE
1 2  3 4
I enjoyed working on the task. 
STRONGLY DISAGREE
1 2  3 4






During the part of the experiment when I had the opportunity 
to read some magazines, play with the task, or sit and do 
nothing,(I felt motivated by outside pressure to choose to 
work on the task.
STRONGLY DISAGREE STRONGLY AGREE
During the part of the experiment described above, I felt 
motivated by inward desire to choose to work on the task.
STRONGLY DISAGREE STRONGLY AGREE
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I would be interested in buying this task as a gift for a 
friend.
STRONGLY DISAGREE STRONGLY AGREE
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I found the task to be practical.
STRONGLY DISAGREE STRONGLY AGREE
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
APPENDIX C
COPY OF THE SCALES MEASURING THE EFFECT OF BEING OBSERVED 
AND OF THE PRESENCE OF A TIME LIMIT
On the following scale, please indicate to what extent you 
felt your behavior on the task was affected by being ob­
served by me.
It was not It was
affected affected
at all ____________________________ very much
On the following scale, please indicate to what extent you 
felt your behavior on the task was affected by a time 
limit.
It was not It was
affected affected
at all_________ ____________________________ very much
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APPENDIX D
COPY OF THE SCALE MEASURING 
FELT COMPETITIVENESS
To what extent did you have competitive feelings towards the 
other subject in the experiment?
I felt very I didn't feel
competitive. ____________________________  competitive at all.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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APPENDIX E
THE POST EXPERIMENTAL QUESTIONNAIRE
1. Were the instructions clear?
2. What do you think the hypothesis of this study was?
3. Have you experienced or heard of the task you just
played with?
4. Were you aware of the other subject's performance?
5. Did the music affect you in any way?
6. Do you think it interfered with your performance?
7. At any point, did you feel .deceived during this experi­
ment?
8. Did you feel free to do what you wanted while I was 
interviewing the other subject?
9. Had you previously read all these magazines?
10. Could you hear me interview the other subject?
11. Do you believe you will keep the money?
12. When did you think I was watching you during this ex­
periment?
13. Were you suspicious about the extra samples of the task 
lying around?
14. Do you know the other subject in the experiment?
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